Current wisdom about the American welfare state’s laggard status among advanced industrial societies, by attributing it to the weakness of the Left and organized labor, poses a historical puzzle. In the 1930s, the United States experienced a dramatically progressive turn in social policy making. New Deal Democrats, dependent on financing from capitalists, passed landmark social insurance reforms without backing from a well-organized and electorally successful labor movement like those in Europe, especially Scandinavia. Sweden, by contrast, with the world’s strongest Social Democratic labor movement, did not pass important social insurance legislation until the following two decades.

During the global crisis of the 1930s, Swedish Social Democrats barely improved on the rather meager social insurance arrangements they inherited from their predecessors to the center and right. Calling themselves socialists, and relying almost exclusively on organized labor for financing, they introduced only modest pension reforms in 1935 and 1937. Organized capital actually supported the changes. To be sure, the Social Democrats’ unemployment insurance law of 1934 did encounter employer resistance. However -- to return to the historical puzzle -- the scheme was distinctly inferior to what business-financed New Deal Democrats introduced with the Social Security Act of 1935.

Thus we know why journalist Marquis Childs found nothing much to write home about in Sweden’s social legislation when he first brought the country to Americans’ attention in the 1930s.
Instead, Childs praised Sweden as a “middle way” between capitalism and socialism for its consumer and producer cooperatives, state enterprise both monopolistic and competitive, and “a strong, all-inclusive labor movement” for making “capitalism work in a reasonable way for the greatest good of the whole nation.” But as powerful as that labor movement was, it was not terribly threatening to Sweden’s capitalists. Franklin Roosevelt’s blue-ribbon commission, sent to Sweden to study its industrial relations, reported in 1938 that employers there were altogether content with the centralizing trajectory of changes in the labor market. Business leaders Gerard Swope of G.E. and Charles R. Hook, director of the National Association of Manufacturers, signed the report.

What makes these comparative and historical facts so puzzling is the commonly held view that when and where labor is organizationally and politically powerful progressive reform is more likely. To cite an influential authority, Gøsta Esping-Andersen explicitly subscribes to the view’s central premise: that “employers have always opposed de-commodification.” By de-commodification he means governmental social insurance, assistance, and services that render people less critically dependent on gainful employment. Practically all comparative literature on the social and political foundations of social policy agrees, implicitly at least, giving Esping-Andersen the go-ahead to assert his contention so confidently. Also, in Esping-Andersen’s view, labor’s interests across countries are roughly equivalent. For labor movements, de-commodification “has always been a priority.” Therefore because of capital’s invariant opposition, de-commodification becomes a “hugely contested issue” within countries. In short, there is a rough equivalence of interests among like classes in different countries, and equivalence of zero-sum conflict across their respective class divides.

From the vantage point of this *equivalency premise*, much comparative research looks for factors other than differences among capitalists to explain national peculiarities in welfare states. Logically enough, it routinely turns to “working class power mobilization,” the “structuration of class power”, or the “political power balance” between labor and capital. Typically, the literature finds evidence in cross-national quantitative analysis of recent years (typically after the 1970's) for the progressive impact of
working class power. The oppositional muscle and volition implied by concepts like labor’s “power mobilization” is operationalized, dubiously it turns out, by union membership levels, organizational structure, and legislative and cabinet seat shares for left-wing or labor parties in advanced capitalist democracies. Esping-Andersen finds, for example, that variations in the “power of the left” in the post-war era explain a substantial amount of variation in the structure (though not, apparently, size) of welfare states in advanced industrial countries. Left power correlates strongly with universalism (no demeaning “means tested” benefits) and degrees of de-commodification (measured as short waiting periods, long eligibility periods, and high income-replacement rates for sick pay, unemployment, and retirement benefits).\textsuperscript{vi}

As in comparative cross-national analysis, the equivalency premise also appears in \textit{temporal explanation} of welfare state development within countries. Walter Korpi on Sweden offers a good example. He attributes social democratic reform in the 1930s to impressive organizational and electoral progress in the 1920s and early 1930s, accompanied by record levels of costly industrial conflict. (He fails however to note how meager the reform was in cross-national terms until the 1940s and beyond, when labor’s power had not substantially increased and militancy had drastically subsided.) On the United States, Fred Block tells a somewhat different story. He attributes reform episodes, the New Deal in particular, to capital’s transitory loss of “structural power” over semi-autonomous democratic politicians. During the Depression, this power to disinvest was exhausted, for investment activity could hardly have sunk any deeper. Though they differ on how to conceptualize and measure power, both Korpi and Block see the welfare state progressing within countries when the balance of power, albeit differently conceived and measured, shifts to labor’s advantage.\textsuperscript{vii}

The equivalency premise now turns up once again, largely intact, in a recent and important contribution to the debate. Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, in an innovative theoretical synthesis, combine an analytic focus on the structural power of capital against reform with a historical-institutionalist narrative.\textsuperscript{viii} Before the Depression, they assert, capitalists’ power to divest locally and
move across state lines in America explains the country’s relative delay in welfare development until the 1930s. State-level politicians’ fear of driving mobile capital out of their states gave business the upper hand as long as politics at the state level monopolized social policy making. Thus federalism imparted a powerful anti-progressive bias to American politics independent of the country’s peculiar ideologies or popular receptivity to reform. Come the Depression, however, and the shift of social politics to the federal level due to massive Democratic party electoral victories, capital suffered a severe structural loss of power and therefore a major defeat with passage of the Social Security Act. Because Hacker and Pierson formulate their argument in explicit opposition to the one advanced here, it will come under close scrutiny and criticism later.

**Interests, Power, and Institutions**

A central purpose of this article is to cast doubt on the equivalency premise and therefore the importance of variable “class power” in comparative and temporal explanation of welfare state development. It indicates, first, that *capitalists’ interests vary at least as much if not more than their power*. I refer to interests as economic and objective in nature. Preferences, by contrast, are strategic and subjective; only partially and sluggishly responsive to interests; and often clouded or as the case may be illuminated by ideology or distrust of government. Second, the analysis shows *variable capitalist interests may often and to a large extent be shaped and constrained by institutions that are of their own making*. They forge these institutions in part through the strategic expenditure of their enormous instrumental resources -- transactional, persuasive, and coercive – over time. To say strategic is not to say that final consequences are intended, for other forces intervene and interact with their creations. A third implication of the analysis is, therefore, that *macroeconomic conditions exogenous to the institutional system can play a decisive intervening role in determining where capitalists’ interests lie*.

In sum, institutionalized and therefore varied capitalist interests probably explain a good deal of variation in welfare state development across countries, and over time, in a way that has never been fully
recognized. Macroeconomic conditions play a role, but not in the way Block, and now Hacker and Pierson, believe. Thus it follows that a changing alignment or sharing of interests across class lines, not a shifting balance of class power favoring labor at capital’s expense, might be the most significant source of progressive and enduring change.

This is not to say, simplistically, that *cross-class alignments or coalitions of interest* are all that determine the course of social policy history. It is thoroughly possible that *class compromises* also give rise to reforms, especially incremental ones, when both sides recognize that the likely costs of entrenched class conflict exceed the benefits of victory, discounted as it would be by its limited probability. A key point is this, however: policy accepted by capitalists under threat from labor is less likely to take root than policy that both sides welcome for its own sake. Fully institutionalized labor market and social policy regimes endure under more auspicious conditions than treaties between hostile parties with nothing in common except a desire to avoid war.

*Employers Against Markets*

To see the possibilities of an institutionally conditioned alignment of labor and capital interests behind welfare state development requires one to grasp a simple, important, and incontrovertible fact: *social policies often regulate competition among capitalists in ways that protect the profits of a politically significant portion of them.* Edwin E. Witte, the Roosevelt administration’s key man in the making of the Social Security Act of 1935, knew this fact. Mentored by University of Wisconsin economist John R. Commons, part of whose salary was paid by capitalists, Witte wanted and expected to appeal to capitalists through social and economic regulation, not to ignore or defy them. Commons’s experience with the Wisconsin Industrial Commission, set up to administer workmen’s compensation and factory safety regulation was that employers on its advisory committees were “more exacting in their search for the highest practicable standards than the representatives of labor on the committees.”†ix Why more exacting standards? Because they would cost the large employers represented on the Commission less to implement
than their smaller competitors.

Thus, as his biographer put it succinctly, Witte “conceived social insurance to be ‘a form of labor legislation’ and hence of regulation.” Commons and Witte knew almost all capitalists pay lip service to free market ideology while actively seeking protective legislation. Capitalist interests in profitable regulation provide the market for “rent seeking” politicians who can deliver the legislation. In other words politicians traffic in entry, price, and output regulations that generate monopoly rents for businesses, who then reward them with a slice of the rent in the form of, among other things, campaign contributions. Political entrepreneurs, of course, also seek broad electoral support and complex patterns of cross-subsidization when designing regulations.

The last thing reformers want, or should want if they are wise self-preservationists, is legislation that antagonizes vast numbers of capitalists with the kind of money that can fight back. Electoral reaction against welfare dependency and government profligacy can fairly easily be aroused -- for example with moralistic hand-wringing about the futility of assisting the poor, perverse incentives that generate welfare dependency, and taxation that jeopardizes the precious liberty and prosperity of those who pay. Thus if politicians can design social policy in which the most politically important capitalists see a regulatory advantage, their prospects of passing durable legislation and staying in power are greater. Politicians in capitalist democracies, do not, as a rule, flourish long as bold class warriors. Optimal for Edwin Witte, a “cautious reformer” according to the title of his biography, was not log rolling or horse trading – buying off businessmen with side payments whose value exceeds the costs of the undesirable social policy packaged with them. Instead it was social policy that, as regulation, was a benefit in and of itself.

Progressive reform politicians often acquire their economic and strategic learning about the cross-class alliance politics of regulatory reform from union leaders and employers engaged in collective bargaining. Collective bargaining itself is a form of regulation welcomed by many employers, as Commons and Witte learned in Wisconsin. FDR learned the same as governor of New York from the garment industry, one of New York’s most important. One thing unions do is to generate monopoly rent
by enforcing wage floors across a product or service market and thus “take wages out of competition.” This benefits employers unable or reluctant to lower wages in response to disruptive and sometimes ruinous price reductions and low-price competitive entry. The rent from repressing low-wage, low-price competition gets shared between employers, as extra profits, and workers, as higher wages, out of the revenue generated from higher product or service prices. Politicians who support this kind of collective bargaining with laws and other services get their share of the rent too.

Students of American industrial relations in the past are quite familiar with the phenomenon of centralized collective bargaining, for example in the coal, clothing, construction, and trucking industries. The late 19th century iron industry -- and even the steel industry from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s -- experienced multi-employer collective bargaining with these purposes and effects.xv The solicitousness of Republicans, even nationally powerful ones like Marcus Hanna and Herbert Hoover, to multi-employer collective bargaining explains warm relations of some unions with the Republican party during the first half of the 20th century. Ohio’s Hanna, the maker of Republican William McKinley’s presidential career, was a prominent mine owner and leading employer statesman -- in the cross-class National Civic Federation for example -- who pioneered multi-employer collective bargaining in coal. That Hoover, once a mining engineer, supported unions in coal mining (“a normal and proper antidote to unlimited capitalistic organization”), and that mining operators in coal states like Ohio and Pennsylvania financed the Republican Party is not a mysterious contradiction. In New York, the Democratic Party was the main political connection for that state’s economically important garment industry.xvi

By getting price of labor wrong in a market-equilibrium sense, collective bargaining generates surpluses or scarcities, depending on fluctuations in demand and supply. When macroeconomic forces intervene, acute instability can result. A relevant historical case in point: Depression in the 1930s destabilized collective bargaining in sectors like mining and clothing by disgorging large numbers of workers into the unemployed labor pool who were ready and willing to take jobs with non-union employers for substandard terms of employment. Non-union entry on a low-wage basis, corrupt sweetheart
contracting, and corrosive scabbing became injuriously rampant for centralized bargaining. Mine operators and garment manufacturers, therefore, joined their respective unions in strongly supporting federal legislation like the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1932 and the Guffey bills of 1935 and 1937 to prop up wages and control production and prices. xvii

This illustration from industrial relations, where people like Commons and Witte learned about cross-class alliance making for regulatory purposes, offers an important conclusion for the politics of the welfare state. Cross-class constituencies of a price setting institutions have interests in policy inoculating them from the pathologies of disequilibrium that their institutions leave them exposed to. Reformers offered welfare policies, the American and Swedish cases will indicate, with a social insurance as well as regulatory logic in mind. They wanted to serve labor and capital, not labor at the expense of capital.

Cartelism, Solidarism and Segmentalism: Institutions that Generate Interests

Historical evidence on the motivational and therefore causal connections between labor markets and reformist social policy making requires first an understanding of distinctly different labor market institutions in which capitalists choose to stake their interests. To understand their stake is the first step in understanding why they also may acquire interests in a regulatory social policy.

(1) Cartelism. In some sectoral settings, most notably in coal, clothing, construction, transportation, and some, mostly light manufacturing, employers often collectively desire to maintain wages that are above market clearing levels all or at least much of the time, and never below. Unions are a necessary partner in the centralized institutions of negotiated cartelism. Using strikes, they enforce on wayward employers the minimum standards agreed upon in collective bargaining, and reduce entry on a low-wage basis. Both sides share the monopoly rent from this non-governmental regulatory floor under product and service prices.

(2) Solidarism. Capitalists may also organize to hold wages below market clearing levels for the
sake of maintaining low prices. Swedish capitalists’ organization and collective action and organization, as we will see, is exactly of this “solidaristic” nature (after Swedish parlance), suited especially to keeping Swedish products price-competitive abroad. Organized labor’s participation in market-defying wage suppression -- unlike employers’ -- may seem somewhat puzzling. Nevertheless, for reasons clarified later, a cross-class alliance for *negotiated solidarism* was the key supportive arch of the Swedish political economy as its welfare state evolved. The solidaristic system and the cross-class alliance helps explain both the unusual organizational strength of the labor movement and puzzling questions about the timing and shaping of the Swedish welfare state.

(3) *Segmentalism.* Instead of cartelism and solidarism, employers can construct a decentralized, but equally well institutionalized system, defined here as *segmentalism.* As in cartelism, they offer higher and more stable wages than necessary to fill their workplaces, pursuing what economists call an “efficiency wage” strategy. Efficiency wage theory’s core assumption is that in some firms, workers' efficiency may be a positive function of their wage, over a certain range of wages, relative to income from alternative employment or dependency relations. But unlike in cartelist sectors, where technological conditions are different, individual firms pay above market wages voluntarily, without external union enforcement. Higher wages help achieve loyalty from workers, reduce turnover costs, reward firm-specific skill acquisition, and secure flexibility and efficiencies in the labor process. Thus it helps employers reap profits from relationship-specific investments in production and managerial technologies. The better employer, in short, gets better workers.

An integral part of the segmentalist labor market regime is the widespread company level provision of social benefits -- “welfare capitalism” in the parlance of historians. Administrative, underwriting, and other economies of scale for group insurance and other benefits make welfare capitalism a cheap efficiency wage strategy for larger employers. The moral economy of equity, reciprocity, and responsibility in workplace relations -- self-imposed normative bounds of managerial sovereignty -- help institutionalize the system. Unions thus may participate in a system of *negotiated segmentalism.* This
“unionized welfare capitalism,” according to one account of post-war U.S. labor relations in major sectors like autos, steel, and other mass production sectors, co-existed with negotiated cartelism in other sectors.\textsuperscript{xxi} Tax legislation lobbied for and defended by a cross-class alliance of unions and employers, allowing firms in both systems to deduct non-wage labor costs from taxable earnings, cemented the institutional set-ups politically.

The following sections begin by discussing American segmentalism at length, and cartelism only very briefly, demonstrating how politicians responded to the interests of both in the passage of social insurance legislation. For the sake of brevity it focuses only the Old Age Insurance portion of the Social Security Act. Then the analysis will turn to Sweden. There, the behavior of political reformers in a radically different institutional context -- solidarism -- will explain a radically divergent and differently timed course of welfare politics.

\textit{From American Employer Strategy to the New Deal}

Very early in the 20th century, major manufacturing employers in the heart of American industry began successfully pursuing a highly decentralized strategy for managing their labor markets. This followed upon their intensely frustrating experience with negotiated cartelism in the steel, machinery, and foundry industries. In the iron industry, for example, manufacturers had once favored cartelism, and along with it, even accepted considerable union restrictions on their right to manage. Negotiated rigidities in managerial practice as well as wage rates offered a regulatory benefit by imposing uniformity in labor costs across a technologically homogeneous industry.\textsuperscript{xxii}

But around the turn of the century rapid and uneven technological change associated with the rise of steel, combined with the abundance of unskilled labor suited to the new technology, later changed their minds. A fateful event in this process was the Homestead Strike of 1892 and its abysmal failure at the hands of Carnegie Steel. Desiring to regain their managerial control for freer introduction of new technology, employers like Carnegie set off on a distinctive individualistic and decentralized course of
action, with collective action reserved primarily for crushing rather than negotiating with unions. The decentralized strategy included, along with blacklisting and strike breaking, offering higher and more stable wages, social benefits, and employment than necessary to fill their workplaces. As the steel industry’s *Iron Age* put it in 1924, “Where there are men at the gates looking for jobs, those inside are always much more efficient.”

Furthermore, abundant evidence of great relevance for the politics of the welfare state indicates that segmentalists, pursuing these policies, turned out to be highly reluctant to reduce their wages and benefits in the face of depression, declining prices, and growing unemployment. Like many other large manufacturers, International Harvester for example struggled to maintain wages in the two years of high unemployment after October 1929 "from the standpoint of employee morale rather than short-run profits.” In 1935, M.C. Rorty, President of the American Management Association, praised such employers who consistently paid above market wages and preached against the “evils of excessive wage reductions.” Wage cuts, he thought, would do more harm than the evils of wage rigidity.

Efficiency wage and kindred theory helps account for the empirically observed downward wage and benefit rigidity of American segmentalists even under Depression-era conditions of labor surplus or unemployment. Thus many employers did not play current employees off against the hordes of unemployed, even if applicants were available and ready to underbid current employees. The trouble came, of course, where segmentalists had to compete at the margin with low-wage and low-benefit competitors who operated more with the “drive system” and in external labor markets, rather than worker good will and low turnover for productive efficiency. Relevant historical examples are the numerous smaller producers competing with segmentalists General Electric, Goodyear, and International Harvester in production of light bulbs, rubber heels and soles, and farm implements.

These competitors, acquiring labor on a more casual basis, took advantage of underbidding and therefore had greater flexibility to lower wages and shed workers to gain advantage in intense price competition when demand was slack and unemployment high. In short, in depressed product markets,
especially where heterogeneous production technology allowed, segmentalists were hurt by price competition from non-segmentalist competitors. The behavior of consumers short of cash -- and of information on the low quality of cheap products and services they shopped for -- made segmentalists all the more vulnerable to substandard competition.

To follow competitors down the low road, segmentalists would have been required, at considerable cost in terms of workplace harmony and efficiency, to violate their company-based moral economy. Firing older, less-productive workers, another option, would also have violated the segmentalist’s promise not to have to face grinding poverty in retirement – and put middle-aged workers on notice of future betrayal. Because their micro-level social contracts gave them distinct market and managerial advantages, segmentalists would be likely to welcome alternatives.

One alternative appeared before them on a silver platter during the Depression: government taxation of the competition through compulsory social insurance. Reluctance to lower wages and benefits to restore profitable efficiency wage differentials from above made them amenable to government action that restored the differentials from below. Only a few segmentalists, corporate progressives who lacked strong ideological blinders and other inhibitions, vocally welcomed regulation of this nature in advance. More understood its potential to reduce segmentalism's vulnerability under conditions of deflation and high unemployment. As J. Douglas Brown, a very prominent corporate-friendly industrial relations expert, put it starkly in his 1935 Senate testimony, social security “protects the more liberal employer,” and “levels up the cost of old-age protection on both the progressive and unprogressive employer.”

Probably most others, more suspicious at the beginning, became converts after the fact. A Fortune magazine survey in 1939 found that fully one in four businessmen surveyed wanted to keep social security as it was, and only about 17 percent wanted to repeal it (the majority favored some adjustments). Years later, in 1949, Brown invoked a fairly broad and favorable business consensus in a speech to the American Management Association, saying that the social insurance principles built into the Social Security Act “grew out of employer experience [and] . . . extend to all the principles found effective by
leading employers.’ Indeed, he said, confirming management’s continuing stake in contributory insurance of a compulsory nature, “they put a floor on competition by short-sighted employers who had avoided the true costs of an effective labor force.” In 1935 Brown probably anticipated this cross-class alliance of interest with capitalism’s most dynamic enterprises behind one of America’s most important reforms of the century. If reformers indeed acted knowingly, intentionally, and strategically in anticipation of capitalist reactions, they were also bending to capitalist power.

That is not to say capitalists pulled any or all the strings of mindless political puppets. Pressures and interests from other quarters also mattered a great deal. As with much progressive reform, ideologically motivated reformers responded to popular pressures, took the initiative, and hoped on electoral payoffs. Rumblings of discontent from below rattled hitherto complacent economic and political elites, jolting them into active search for reforms that could satisfy popular pressures and serve capitalist interests at the same time.

*Old Age Insurance.* A look at the Old Age Insurance (OAI) component of the Social Security Act of 1935 (SSA) will indicate the enormous plausibility, if not certainty, that the New Dealers, like Brown, were anticipating capitalist interests and reactions. Corporate progressives from the segmentalist camp were most prominent nationally in revealing to liberal politicians the changing nature of their interests. Most active on the social insurance front were individual businessmen like Gerard Swope from General Electric and Marion Folsom of Eastman Kodak, both of whom were brought into administration discussions about an “Economic Security Act.” Swope had advocated corporatist, albeit quasi-private social insurance, including disability protection, in his famous “Swope Plan” of 1931. The plan was an important inspiration for FDR’s corporatist-cartelist National Industrial Recovery Act. (For more on the significance of the NIRA for the SSA, see below.) But it was also a strong signal of interest in the regulatory benefits of social insurance. Swope’s plan would have empowered sector-specific trade associations to extend their own – better standards on non-members, and therefore "place the same social burdens on companies competing in various parts of the United States." If necessary, federal government
enforcement would be enlisted. Likewise, Marion Folsom changed his view from the 1920s that voluntary action was enough. His Depression experiences persuaded him that “the only thing to do” was have the federal government impose a solution.\textsuperscript{xxxi}

In deliberations on the SSA, the Roosevelt administration also relied heavily on the intellectual services of experts like Brown, mentioned above, and Murray Webb Latimer, both tied by careers and heavy financial dependence to Rockefeller wealth from the oil industry. (Walter Teagle from Rockefeller’s Standard Oil of New Jersey joined Swope and Folsom in an advisory capacity to Witte). Latimer was an employee of Industrial Relations Counselors Inc. (IRC), a high-quality outfit heavily dependent on financing from John D. Rockefeller, Jr., as G. William Domhoff makes abundantly clear. In fact, according to Witte, “almost the entire research staff of the [IRC] was placed on the payroll” of FDR’s Committee on Economic Security (CES) to study the matter of unemployment insurance.\textsuperscript{xxxii}

Rockefeller’s possible behind-the-scenes encouragement is interesting to speculate on. In 1933, Raymond Fosdick, Rockefeller’s attorney and close advisor (and FDR friend), reported glowingly to Rockefeller on IRC activities. In his letter he reminded Rockefeller that his contributions to the IRC in 1932 were seven times as great as its service revenue and consulting retainers. Among other things Fosdick praised were IRC activities in “shaping and administering [unemployment and pension] legislation” in Wisconsin and Minnesota, and pursuing contracts to do the same in two other states and Canada. All this he included in a letter whose purpose was to persuade the oil baron to give more money to the IRC.\textsuperscript{xxxiii}

The oil industry offers an excellent example of segmentalists with regulatory interests in social legislation during the Depression. Slack demand and high unemployment exposed the oil industry, even the Rockefeller imperium, to disruptive competition from low-wage and low-benefit product market competitors. In written testimony to the Senate, an editor of \textit{National Petroleum News} declared that “most if not all of bigger oil companies now have, and some have had for many years, various forms of pensions.” If their thousands of competitors “were forced to contribute to such protection as bigger companies are now doing, it might help to lessen some of their price cutting by bringing up their
Low-standard manufacturers in many other product markets as well relied less on worker goodwill and low turnover for productive efficiencies than the big companies. And because they reaped the benefits of the major employers’ success in crippling organized labor, they enjoyed great flexibility to lower wages and shed workers to gain advantage in intense price competition. To that extent, segmentalists fouled their own nests. New entrants to competition could enlist unemployed workers at very low wages. To follow low-standard competitors down the low road, segmentalists would have had to violate their institutionalized, company-based moral economy. Those who went ahead with deep cuts faced worker unrest, and those who cut back the most were most vulnerable to a militant strain of industrial unionism.

Because their benefits practices gave them market and managerial advantages (and relative peace from union organizers), segmentalists’ interest lay in compulsory social insurance taxation of their competitors. This would compensate them for segmentalism's vulnerability under combined conditions of deflation, unemployment, and union weakness. OAI would reduce the profoundly unwelcome pressure to cut back on company welfare commitments, or at least make it possible to do so without pushing retirees in poverty. Once passed, it gave companies like International Harvester, as predicted, a welcome escape from its expensive company plan. It also “put the company on an equal pension cost basis with the growing number of farm implement competitors,” according to Harvester historian Robert Ozanne.

Harvester’s experience in this particular regard sheds light on a fascinating episode, about which we still know relatively little, in the Roosevelt administration’s OAI deliberations. When the cabinet-level Committee on Economic Security (CES) contemplated dropping old age insurance from the bill, New Deal big business advisors strongly urged them not to. We know about this truly extraordinary intervention primarily from CES staffer Brown. Brown argues that the Townsend Movement for a non-contributory pension out of general revenue was the bugbear that kept the reformers going. But Roosevelt, Witte, and most Congressmen were in full agreement with the businessmen that the Townsend Plan was a
disastrously expensive and even fraudulently marketed idea. So this is probably not the whole story behind the corporate progressives’ urgent intervention.

For one thing, the OAI carrot was every bit as tempting to the corporate progressives as the Townsend stick was threatening. Not only did it have a regulatory advantage for segmentalists as a whole; it also delivered a large subsidy for many of the 300 or so large employers across America ones who had company plans, many of them very badly administered. Company pension plans, all too often, were badly or entirely unfunded -- an actuary’s nightmare, a money-hungry “juggernaut” (as a consultant from the Business Research Corporation put it) that employers had unwittingly set in motion in the 1920s. As much thought had gone into them as into ordering pencils, according to one analysis. A good deal of the IRC’s current consulting business consisted of rationalizing company plans to keep them out of dire trouble. These were the same people designing a compulsory public system that would relieve many of them of unaffordable pension promises they had made to their workers.

The crisis was exacerbated by intense price competition from manufacturers who had made no pension promises and employed younger workers, or were now hiring up large numbers of the desperate and undemanding unemployed. Now, with the Depression in full force, the need to retire large numbers of less-productive elderly workers, and fulfill their pension promises to them, assumed crisis proportions. One possibility in this situation was to purchase retirement insurance on their employees behalf. But what they would have had to pay now on the private insurance market was, an IRC study estimated in August 1935 (the same month the SSA passed), 33 to 100 percent more than what OAI was going to charge to guarantee the exact same benefits their workers were to receive with OAI. We know for certain, as evidence in a later section will prove, that the CES and its Business Advisory group were aware of advantages like these, if not their magnitude, well before August.

In sum, the New Dealers knew that OAI offered a large bailout as well as a regulatory blessing for major segmentalists. But they were not the only ones with interests, understood by the reformers, in legislation that would impose a floor on labor costs. This holds true especially in the case of cartelists who
were also plagued by the cut-throat low-wage/low-price competition associated with deflation and unemployment. One example will have to suffice. In 1930, the New York Building Congress, a cross-class confederation composed of over 600 municipal contractor associations and unions, began, as far back as 1930, to call for compulsory pensions. It sent a lengthy report from 1932, advocating the same, to the Senate as its position on the matter. (Its chairman, a vice president of F.W. Dodge Corporation, also believed a compulsory unemployment insurance system was “inevitable and desirable.”) This was the same organization that testified in favor of New York Senator Robert Wagner’s labor relations bill, for its potential to empower unions to uphold wage standards “for the benefit in the long run of the employers of that industry.” Imposing standard pension costs across the building industry would also conform nicely with negotiated cartelism, especially by enlisting the power of the state to impose new costs on substandard, non-union contractors.

The Swedish Labor Market Regime

As the above, rather abbreviated analysis shows, reform politicians in America knew that social insurance reform would have a regulatory effect on competition benefitting both segmentalists and cartelists. Highly knowledgeable advisors instructed them on the facts, as did actual industry leaders. A plausible if not yet entirely compelling case emerges, therefore, for the verdict that reformers were not defying but rather consciously appealing to capitalist interests in passage of the retirement security portion of the SSA. Similar evidence can be brought to bear regarding other aspects of the New Deal, and earlier excellent works with similar or related arguments and evidence -- especially those of Jill Quadagno and Colin Gordon – can be consulted. Much more will be adduced on OAI in the discussion of Hacker’s and Pierson’s alternative argument below.

In the meantime, comparative evidence will advance the analysis better than further detail on the New Deal. If it can be shown, for example, that breakthrough reforms in Sweden waited until capitalist interests had swung into alignment with those of the labor movement, the historically specific argument
about the New Deal gains in plausibility, and the general case for balance of class power theories of welfare state development loses persuasiveness.

Solidarism. Understanding the Swedish labor market regime requires examining its features in light of the same economic theory about labor markets discussed earlier in the context of American segmentalism. Because Swedish employers in the period before and during the major social policy reforms of the 1940s and 1950s were organized in highly centralized and authoritative organizations, the following questions arise: If large-scale employers who are inclined to favor an efficiency wage and welfare capitalist strategy are able to overcome numerous obstacles to joining together in a collaborative strategy, how would their wages and benefits differ? If they chose a centralized multi-employer approach, what would the effects on the interfirm and interindustry wage structure be? How would they deal with the problems of labor supply, turnover, and effort? What would make it possible for them to enforce the collective choice?

An interesting offshoot of the efficiency wage literature helps answer some of these questions. Beginning, crucially, with the theory’s assumption of a wage-productivity nexus, models of unilateral centralized pay setting by a highly disciplined association of employers indicate that wages would be set lower than in the decentralized model. Likewise, employment would be higher. Interestingly, the same conclusions hold for models incorporating joint union influence in negotiations. According to these models, the gain to employers from lower overall wage levels (inhibitions on individual firms' attempts to achieve an efficiency advantage with higher relative wages) outweigh the loss from reduced worker effort associated with lower unemployment. Total profits, therefore, would exceed those achieved in the decentralized equilibrium.

The “equilibrium” in the centralized model is one where many firms offer wages below market-clearing levels, not above, as in the segmentalist case. In other words, the marginal revenue to a firm of hiring one additional worker exceeds the wage the firm has agreed to offer under the terms of the centralized arrangement. In that sense, centralization creates for many firms a scarcity of labor. That is to
say, there will be a shortage of workers willing to take work at the low, market-defying rate. Many firms, in this case, would actually prefer to raise wages to reduce quits or shirking on the job, expand employment and production, or otherwise improve productivity and profits. But this would only work if others voluntarily abstain or can be prevented from following suit. Because “poaching,” or cheating on the arrangement by raising wages would be profitable, centralized wage setting presupposes some mechanism for monitoring adherence and punishing violations.

In short, the centralized equilibrium sees “involuntary” underpricing of labor by the individual employer, and a scarcity of labor, rather than the segmentalist’s voluntary overpricing and excess labor. Because segmentalist behavior is voluntary, no external agency is necessary to enforce it. But in solidarism, monitoring and policing the actions of individual firms must succeed to make it possible to speak of any kind of equilibrium. This is an artificial equilibrium, however, in an economic sense, for individual firms have a strong profit-motivated interest to behave in ways that would upset it. Workers will gladly rock the boat by offering their services at higher wages.\textsuperscript{xlvii}

For reasons that cannot detain us here, analysis of solidarism indicates that in addition to setting wages across much of the labor market below equilibrium, employers will also collectively pursue a number of other policies designed to maintain solidarism’s viability. The most striking of these is to facilitate compliance with wage restraint and reduce turnover by coordinating and enforcing pay policies in the direction of pay compression in the form of interfirm and intersectoral pay standardization. In part this is simply the most viable administrative rule for maintaining the legitimacy, supported by norms of fair competition over labor, of a rationing system (allocated wages instead of coupons or stamps) under conditions of scarcity. Wage compression in the form of ceilings becomes more important than the wage floors associated with negotiated cartelism; wage floors are largely superfluous, given the scarcity phenomenon.\textsuperscript{xlviii}

Most important for the current analysis, collectively employers are likely to regulate the use of company-based social benefits. This tendency is part and parcel of the solidaristic policy of pay
compression. For several reasons, a solidaristic employers’ association is likely to choose suppression and even elimination of company welfare over centralized regulation. Heterogeneity in capital and labor force attributes, along with other market constraints, will make agreement difficult to reach on common standards due to funding and benefit costs that vary considerably across firms. Labor-intensive, dangerous, or unhealthy firms or sectors, for example, will have dramatically higher insurance costs than others who will be reluctant to cross-subsidize them to even out the costs. Given a failure to achieve agreement around standardized schemes, complicated by the presence of pre-existing company based benefits, suppression of benefit growth and expansion may be the employer association’s most feasible option. Complete elimination also recommends itself, but, as Sweden suggests, political intervention with compulsory alternatives may be necessary.

Of course unions have to be part of the picture. Solidarism, in theory, can be pursued unilaterally by employers. Given its emphasis on wage repression, this might be the only thing one would expect to see. But a cross-class alliance with organized labor at a highly centralized level is also a possibility, as indicated above, and may serve as the necessary cement of solidarism. It may in fact be only in the crucible of conflict with unions, and the evolution of centralized relations within and between employer and union camps, that the cohesive norms and disciplinary mechanisms of solidarism arise among employers.

Because organized labor's common concerns for pay equity harmonize well with organized employers' self-interest in pay standardization, solidaristic employers have something to offer unions in exchange for rigid wage discipline. Also, labor’s ideological concerns about equity across the entire labor force, not just for those currently employed, give it reason to favor low levels of unemployment, and therefore restrain workers’ demands. Finally, centralized governance of labor markets may win the approval and participation of organized labor because it promises to strengthen the insecure hierarchical control of union leaders over their fractious membership and sub-units. Union leaders may promote the solidaristic policies as their own, propagate egalitarian norms to justify them, and likewise participate in their design and implementation.
Solidaristic Social Policy Interests. Wage compression, benefit suppression, and collaborative relations with unions are all strikingly distinctive features of Swedish industrial relations through much of the 20th century. Among people familiar with the country’s system, the policy of wage leveling, which came to be known as solidaristic wage policy, is widely known. Along with compression it included wage restraint. Usually, experts regard the restraint as the union’s concession to employers in exchange for the compression that employers did not want. That, very strong evidence indicates is incorrect. Solidaristic policy was not founded on a log-roll (concession of a relatively inexpensive x in exchange for a highly valued y) or class compromise (concession of an expensive x in exchange for a valuable y in order to economize on future conflict). It was founded on a cross-class alignment of interests (both sides valued x).1

To the extent that solidaristic governance of wages was effective, the strong incentive to attract and retain scarce labor created the temptation to cheat with non-cash forms of remuneration. Among them, of course, were company-based welfare-type benefits that could not be easily monitored, measured, and regulated by the centralized institutions of the labor market. The temptation became especially acute in the context of strong, expansionary demand pressures in the post-war period. While supporting the solidaristic system in principle, many employers took opportunistic free-riding advantage of it. Sometimes whole sectoral associations moved opportunistically, and therefore unsolidaristically, ahead of others in order to standardize and thus regulate high-benefit competition within their industries. Thus private welfare benefits experienced rapid and from the organization’s standpoint disturbing growth in the 1940s and early 1950s.

It was at this time that Social Democrats in Sweden introduced their dramatic reforms. The employers’ confederation clearly signaled its interest in legislation and, because of legislation, removal of social benefits from the wage bargain. Putting welfare on the legislative agenda, they hoped, would help them manage the labor market on a solidaristic basis -- i.e., by reducing pressure from below on individual employers all too eager to offer concessions. With the buoyant macroeconomic conditions of the postwar period, then, Swedish employers took their foot off the brake on the welfare state, placidly allowing Social
Democracy to pass American developments on the left.

The Origins and Development of Swedish Solidarism

The solidaristic tendencies of Swedish capitalists emerged early, at the beginning of the 20th century. Undoubtedly, Sweden’s small size and cultural homogeneity helped. With relative ease all major employers could meet face to face, reach an overriding consensus on essential matters, and sanction most deviants. Though enabling or facilitative, these factors were not motivational, and therefore not sufficiently explanatory. The motivational factors are more interesting. First of all, there was a dynamic entrepreneurial elite, allied with bank finance, intent on industrial development for export markets, and eager to take advantage of a literate and skilled labor force, from manual operatives and craftsmen to schooled engineers. Their chief obstacles were twofold. In labor productivity, still at French and Italian levels, Swedish industry lagged woefully behind the United States, England, and Germany. Swedish industry was not yet price competitive. To make matters worse, it was not wage competitive either. Swedes by the droves were leaving the country, mostly never to return, and mostly to America. Agriculture looked more promising there, and high labor productivity gave rise to enticingly high industrial working class incomes. The mere chance of a high pay job with an American segmentalist made the Atlantic passage a tempting lottery ticket.

Swedish industry could raise wages to retain its quality labor force, but only at the immediately intolerable expense of reduced price competitiveness on international markets. The alternative was, first, in the short run, to do whatever possible to neutralize international and domestic labor market forces driving wages up. Second, as fast as possible, industry needed to raise productivity to accommodate an orderly rise in incomes and thus relieve pressure to manage the labor market. Intriguingly, one thing employer confederation leader Hjalmar von Sydow recommended in 1915 against emigration was national social insurance. Germany, the vanguard in national legislation, had demonstrated “that well designed social insurance is the best means to inhibit emigration.” Even early on, Swedish employers saw a regulatory
purpose for social insurance.

For managing domestic labor market competition, employer leaders favored keeping a lid on individual employers’ wage and benefit practices. They also recommended the use of sweeping, multi-employer lockouts to counter the whip-saw tactics of the unions, which, taking advantage of labor shortages, drove up wages enterprise by enterprise. The lockout administered quick bloodlettings from union’s carefully husbanded strike funds, adequate only for the support of a small number of individual conflicts at any one time, not for blanket lockout support.

That left the crucial and almost equally immediate matter of raising productivity. Difficulty in expanding production by hiring more labor made it microeconomically imperative. Collective action proved essential. For their productivity mission, employers also resorted to the sweeping offensive and sympathy lockouts -- to impose managerial absolutism. With the lockout they achieved the complete right to manage with a degree of long-lasting success that American employers could only have marveled at. Thus, in imposing wage restraint and managerial control, the encompassing multi-industry lockout gave organized capital in Sweden the ability to whip unions into a shape that made them highly attractive as partners in centralized regulation of labor markets. Aggressive use of the lockout probably elevated workers’ desire to join these well-disciplined unions: their dues doubled as a lockout insurance premium.

The story of solidarism begins, in many ways, in 1905. That year VF, the Swedish Engineering Employers’ Association (Verkstadsföreningen), carried out a massive lockout to bring the Swedish Metalworkers’ Union (Metall, or Metallindustriarbetareförbundet) to the centralized bargaining table. One result was a skill-graded and regionally differentiated system of minimum wages. Most important for employers, it imposed a no-strike commitment for the duration of the contract. Better yet, it formalized Metall’s recognition of employers’ complete right to hire, fire, and otherwise manage the shop floor. This meant open shop conditions, no restriction on management’s introduction and manning of machinery. The contract even encouraged the use of piece work.

Industry-wide and multi-industry lockouts called by SAF, the multi-sectoral Swedish Employers’
Confederation (*Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen*), which until 1918 had yet to absorb VF, achieved the same ends in other sectors. Sector-level centralized bargaining emerged first, in 1908, for the rural steel, and sawmill sectors after threats of a sympathetic multi-industry lockout from SAF. VF promised to help out steel with a sympathetic lockout of metalworkers -- to bankrupt Metall, which organized and therefore provided lockout support in both engineering and steel. Textiles followed in 1914, forcing centralized bargaining on a union badly crippled by the disastrous results of the 1909 mass strike. Some textile employers objected that this would resuscitate a union “that in effect has ceased to exist.” The national leadership, however, saw revival of the union for negotiated labor market regulation as a good thing -- for solidaristic reasons to be mentioned shortly.

The early 1920s saw a big wave of centralization, always accompanied by multi-employer and often multi-industry lockouts, or by credible threats thereof. Employers in the woodworking, paper, and building industries all hammered at the unions with SAF’s and VF’s backing, achieving the centralization they wanted, and on favorable terms. Pulp producers followed in 1921, and with their success the most important sectors of the Swedish economy had been corralled into the institutions of solidaristic regulation.

*Wage Standardization.* That sectoral multi-employer bargaining brought solidarism, not negotiated cartelism, is manifestly apparent in the substance of the centralized agreements forged. The 1914 agreement in textiles, for example, installed a remarkable system, with no conventional English translation, of “normal wages” (*normallöner*) for unskilled operatives. This system imposed both minimum and maximum wages. Normal wages offered the hope of neutralizing the revival of decentralized labor market pressure for wage increases. Freely mobile labor seemed to be more a problem than localized strikes, for labor scarcities were pushing wages upward. Firms were under great pressure to give up too much, because, simply, “workers will not stay put.” These were not the concerns of American employers seeking the rewards of centralized negotiated cartelism, where the problem was “chiseling” -- price competition based on low wages made possible by labor surplus. Partly because of the normal wage system, the textile association’s leadership boasted that “no other employer organization has so completely pushed through its
demands as we have done.” Nevertheless, more needed to be done, according to the association’s yearly report, for “full equalization of working and wage conditions in the textile industry.” This was the one of the employers’ association’s foremost tasks, “independent of . . . the workers’ organization’s cooperation therewith.”

The solidaristic normal wage system spread to other sectors. Paper, paper pulp, and construction opted for normal wage schemes in 1921. The engineering employers came under intense criticism from other sectors, especially textiles, for failure its failure to cap wages. Labor scarcity in textiles was partly a consequence of the drift of manpower away from textile producing areas and across sectoral lines into engineering, with its higher and upwardly drifting wages. For technical reasons peculiar to the highly heterogeneous sector, engineering rejected normal wages, but tried to deal with the wage drift problem in 1923 with a complex surrogate. With normal wages or an alternative in place, firms that exceeded their ceilings were exposed to the censure and sanctions of their associations -- just as workers taking wages below negotiated minima in American joint cartelism were subject to the censure of their union comrades.

**Solidaristic Suppression of Welfare Capitalism.** Early on, eliminating company-based social benefits stood high on Swedish employers’ collective agenda -- unlike in the United States, where all major employer associations dominated by segmentalists uniformly and energetically preached the virtues of “welfare work.” Although it was not spelled out in writing, the 1905 VF-Metall agreement occasioned the wholesale dumping of physician, credit, and accident insurance benefits by at one major shipbuilding firm. In 1939, looking back, a prominent shipbuilder and employer statesman recalled, with gratification, VF’s success in 1905 as a clean break with paternalism. At one of Sweden’s largest machine making works, social benefits as a proportion of total remuneration dropped after peaking in the 1905-1909 period, as the engineering agreement sunk its institutional roots. Centralized bargaining, according another prominent employer leader, the director of Sweden’s largest building materials firm, allowed him to stop being a “benevolent patriarch.” It was better, he thought, that workers “help themselves” with strong unions and the wages they
The first sector to act collectively to eliminate corporate welfarism was steel. In 1908 steel employers surprised and angered the union by announcing their intentions, backed by a lockout, to purge all remuneration with in-kind goods and services. Members had agreed among themselves to eliminate everything from housing, physician, and hospital benefits to free firewood and “potato land.” The employers succeeded – at least on paper – in purging most paternalistic benefits. The victory, it turned out, was pyrrhic, but the metalworkers’ union was not to blame. The problem was individual employers who unilaterally reinstated them. In the same year, 1908, sawmill employers also sought and achieved, against many workers’ misgivings, a partial liquidation of in-kind company benefits. The union accepted the principle of cash only for remuneration, although the freedom for individual companies to opt for social benefits remained untouched.

The textile agreement of 1914 required individual employers to eliminate in-kind remuneration like worker housing. Medical services and accident benefits were retained for the time being, though standardized across the industry. In 1921, paper employers collectively bought off company welfare benefits with standardized wages. Elimination of social benefits had been a desideratum since the organization’s inception in 1907. In 1922, engineering employers took unilateral action, during a temporary hiatus in centralized bargaining, ordering member firms to eliminate all in-kind company benefits, such as free medicine, and free or subsidized housing and other "necessities". In 1932, with backing from LO, the Swedish Labor Confederation (Landsorganisationen), pulp employers imposed an agreement that included "an old demand" -- substantial elimination of social benefits like rent subsidies and free company housing.

Postwar Conditions and Benefit Drift. From its inception, the immediate and inevitable consequence of wage restraint, especially for the most dynamic capitalist enterprises, was labor scarcity. For them, wage restraint delivered high profits and relatedly, excess demand for labor. To avoid costly lockouts, and in exchange for a more stable and equitable wage structure -- not to mention a secure, high-
prestige role for union officials -- unions participated in setting these below market wages. The consequences were almost inevitable: labor poaching and wage and benefit drift.

For example, less than a year and a half after the 1905 engineering agreement, manufacturers in engineering complained bitterly about fellow employers, and little about Metall. We are witnessing, as one put it, "the most cutthroat and worst sort of competition that exists, when . . . people drive up wages by outbidding each other." Because the shops were “so piled up with work . . . there are too few skilled men.” The best thing to do, he said, was to take in more apprentices, because “by competing with each other and driving up wages we cannot create more men.”

With Social Democrats in power in the 1930s, LO did more to hold back wage militancy, especially its emanations from the construction sector, than fan its flames. Revival of economic growth in the late 1930s started to bring similar “wage drift.” Rising piece work earnings contributed, for firms studiously neglected to reset piece rates with the advance of labor productivity. Also, employers held each others’ "disloyal recruitment” responsible. Frustration turned into alarm as these phenomena flourished during the war years and beyond. Again, the labor confederation continued to help restrain wages.

The years 1945 and 1946 were extreme, but the symptoms of labor market disequilibrium arising from wage restraint and intrasectoral leveling in the face of strong growth were not atypical of what happened in ensuing years. Growth in the face of continuing centralized wage restraint brought such unquenchable demand for labor that by June of 1946 only about 104 men sought jobs through the government employment exchanges for every 100 non-agricultural blue collar jobs registered as vacant by employers. The situation was worse for employers seeking female workers: only 75 turned to the exchanges for every 100 jobs registered. Profitable textile employers continued to compete heavily with engineering, which wished to increase its female labor force by no less than 24%, no doubt at the expense of the textile industry and other traditionally female sectors. Textile employers could do little more than sharpen their own restrictions against advertising for labor and poaching from each other, just as engineering employers did the year before.
Unemployment among union members reached rock bottom at about 2% in 1946. SAF calculated that Swedish industry could easily have absorbed another 100,000 to 120,000 workers at repressed wage levels; labor mobility and turnover was "abnormally high". About 5% of all workers changed jobs on a monthly basis, a disturbing number of "job hoppers" (*hoppjerker*). The Social Democratic government tried with prolonged wartime building controls to check upward wage pressures from the high-wage building sector. Top employers had called for these state measures, while also resolving among themselves not to "let wage competition run free."\textsuperscript{lxii}

In the late 1940s, mutual recriminations about disloyal wage practices, sometimes called "black market wages" (*svartabörslöner*), rose in volume.\textsuperscript{lxiii} Social benefits, not just wages, also came under increasing censure. Some sectors blamed their alarming loss of manpower on big employers who provided "all manner of generous perquisites, vacation cottages, and benefit funds for workers." Two breweries expelled from SAF for granting extra high pay raises without permission blamed the social benefits in other sectors for their actions. SAF began issuing circulars to individual members harshly criticizing the "unhealthy phenomenon" of year-end bonuses, whose purpose was largely to "gain advantage in competition over labor." Collective agreements, SAF pointed out, carry with them not just a commitment to workers but also -- with respect to fellow employers -- "an obligation not to exceed contractual wages."\textsuperscript{lxiv} Herein lay a chief virtue of negotiated solidarism.

*The Solidaristic Welfare State: Three Major Developments of the 1940s and 1950s*

Chronic problems of labor scarcity, poaching, and the upward drift of wages and benefits continued the rest of the decade and into the 1950's.\textsuperscript{lv} In the four years after 1948, SAF’s surveys showed that company housing, health, pension, and other social expenses rose from about 3 percent of total labor costs for manual workers to about 8 percent. For workers in mining, forest products, and chemicals, the averages were roughly 18% in 1948, where housing benefits accounted for something between 3 and 9 percent of blue-collar wages. (Americans also experienced a rise in big company benefits resulting from
the state-imposed, wage-suppressive, and therefore labor-scarce solidarism of World War II.)

The employers’ confederation leadership looked on rather haplessly, having failed persuading key sectors to grant them effective authority to control the developments effectively. Help came from an unexpected source, with its own, distinct motives. The labor movement was frustrated too, for internal disagreement among employers, resulting from the dramatically different impact of collectively bargained standardization and improvement, left an intolerable mess: halting and uneven development of social benefits. Looking back at the Social Democratic government’s push for legislated reforms, LO chairman Arne Geijer said “when it comes to social reforms, [collective] bargaining has not been a successful means.” At the bargaining table, organized employers “have not wanted to concede social reforms.”

Organized labor’s frustration did not lead to much action, however. Membership interests were uncertain, divided along generational as well as sectoral lines. Many union members, especially younger ones, gladly saw today’s take-home pay as better than tomorrow’s benefits, and union leaders were happy to oblige them. Disinterest and division, therefore, were shared across class lines. This immobility displaced pressures for social policy to the political arena. By creating the institutional setting that obstructed change, Swedish employers may have produced an outcome, legislative action, that they did not exactly intend. Nevertheless, it was to be a welcome one. Major regulatory advantages outweighed minor imperfections in three of the most groundbreaking pieces of the Swedish welfare state passed by Social Democratic governments. Analysis of employer interests, illuminated by an understanding of the workings of solidarism, explain why.

People’s Pensions. As tensions inside SAF over the leadership’s desire to suppress segmentalist cheating with company benefits grew, the Social Democratic government passed its first major universalistic social insurance reform in 1946. This legislation brought a large increase in the uniform, flat-rate “people’s pension” (folkpension) last revised in 1937. The fiscally conservative Social Democratic government had initially favored a cheaper, more means-tested system concentrating resources on the more needy. By contrast, ironically, the Conservative Party came out
openly against means testing and favored the more expensive universalistic solution.\textsuperscript{lviii}

The Conservatives’ position was probably influenced by SAF. From the very beginning SAF "totally rejected" a cheaper incomes-tested scheme. Means-testing would, SAF feared, reduce incentives for pension recipients “to improve their situation through work and savings.” In other words, labor scarcity would be exacerbated if workers’ earned incomes and assets disqualified them from receiving full government pensions at age 67. SAF's executive director Fritjof Söderbäck insisted that aging workers with “the ability and will to offer their manpower to the disposition of the national economy, should not . . . suffer a substantial reduction in their people's pension.”\textsuperscript{lxix}

These same concerns were echoed in the government's report.

The labor confederation agreed with the employer leadership. On the great similarity in SAF's and LO's views about the size and structuring of pensions, an editorial in \textit{Dagens Nyheter}, entitled "Between Brothers," speculated that some sort of secret agreement had been reached on the matter. This solid cross-class unity must have contributed to the government’s change of mind. The reform, to take effect in 1948, passed with broad, multi-party support. Though not exactly a “triumph for the right,” as the Conservatives’ \textit{Sydsvenska Dagbladet} put it, it was at least an occasion of “national unity,” as the Liberals’ \textit{Dagens Nyheter} proclaimed.\textsuperscript{lxx}

SAF did not simply choose universalism over means testing as the lesser of two inevitable legislative evils. Internal SAF documents show unequivocal welcome for government action. Private provision of pensions only confounded SAF’s efforts to govern the labor market on a solidaristic basis. Shortly before passage, turmoil over private benefits was intense and interest in state measures heightened. Before the legislation was passed, SAF’s Motor Vehicle Transport Employers' Association warmly endorsed the universalistic scheme, hoping "that the government pensions would assume such dimensions and form that the worker pension issue [will be] completely settled and that requests for further pension benefits from employers can be rejected.” It was in the throes of internal conflict over the issue, because unorganized firms were raising benefits to compete over
labor with the public sector as well as with more restrained SAF members.\textsuperscript{lxvi}  

In 1947, when tight labor market conditions of the year before only intensified, SAF discussions reveal that members welcomed legislation for the relief it provided from pressure on firms to use pensions as a “drawing card” to attract labor.\textsuperscript{lxvii} Tensions flared between engineering and the steel and forest product employers; the rural industries’ current company pensions were mostly higher than the ceiling desired by engineering. The debate did not lead to solidaristic unity over ceilings on supplementary company pensions – and therefore reductions in some firms. Nevertheless there was broad consensus on the need, at least, to freeze company pensions at current albeit uneven levels. Not a single voice expressed a desire to reverse the legislation or mourned the idea of employers’ prime responsibility for pensions.

\textit{Comprehensive Health Insurance and Sick Pay}. A similar story can be told about the passage of health legislation in 1953.\textsuperscript{lxviii} Organized capital had supported the introduction of government subsidies and regulation of voluntary funds in 1931, before the Social Democrats came to power. At the time SAF hoped that the legislation would make generous protection widely available and could therefore “in employers’ and workers’ common interest” help unburden employers of their widely varying company health care expenses.\textsuperscript{lxix}

Employers’ hopes were fully dashed because of labor scarcity and especially the unregulated growth of company benefits, especially sick pay, in the 1940s. By the early-1950s, practically all workers employed by SAF members received some mix of free or subsidized physician's services, inpatient benefits, sick pay, and employer assumption of payments into the subsidized fund system.\textsuperscript{lxx} The 1953 legislation swept away this entire patchwork system, guaranteeing all citizens a uniform system of free hospitalization, generous health benefits, and up to two years’ sick pay, all financed by a combination of payroll taxes and general revenue.\textsuperscript{lxxi} Implementation in 1955 allowed employers to rapidly retire all health benefits whether unilateral or negotiated. In a 1954 high-level strategy discussion, SAF’s vice executive director urged members to seize the opportunity and "clear
out health benefits." Benefits were bought back with wage increases that only partially ate up the savings. More important than the savings was the end to the benefits race.

SAF’s chief expert on social insurance sat on the commission that drafted the legislation. He also argued with employers critical of various details of the complex legislation to overlook them in light of its advantages. Overall the response in SAF was positive, and again, as with pensions, not a single voice of opposition was raised in internal debate and documents defending company benefits and the existing semi-private, voluntary insurance system. Even attitudes in rural-based industry, where welfare benefits were most pervasive, were favorable to the government solution. A history of the paper pulp industry association reported simply, and somewhat simplistically, that “an administratively burdensome task” had been handed over to the government.

For a mix of complex reasons, employers in SAF strongly favored sick pay scaled according to a worker’s wages, not a flat, and therefore cheaper Beveridge-style system, which Social Democratic Minister of Social Affairs Gustav Möller fervently advocated. Möller expected privately provided or negotiated supplements to fill them out. But SAF wanted employers out of the business altogether. Initially, LO was uncertain and divided on the issue. By 1953, however, the labor confederation reached consensus with a more resolute SAF on the sick pay question and away from Möller’s position. This alliance no doubt helped swing the government toward the more comprehensive, compulsory system. Once again, as with the pension reform of 1946, a cross-class coalition of the employer and labor confederations prevailed over Social Democrats’ initial plans for cheaper and less comprehensive reforms.

**Active Labor Market Policy.** No major Social Democratic reform initiative of the period is so closely identified with the innovativeness if not power of the left in Sweden than its famous “active labor market policy” (ALMP). ALMP’s expenditures and innovative development took off after the mid-1950s, when Social Democratic governments began lavishing ever growing public resources on various programs like the retraining and geographic relocation of workers made redundant by
rapid technological and market changes. Workers in depopulating areas even got help with selling their homes, many of which were acquired as a company benefit; ALMP thus helped SAF uproot some remnants of welfare capitalism. Other policies remained important, such as temporary job creation to keep people off passive measures like unemployment compensation, and in healthy, active contact with the labor market. However, the active supply-side programs like retraining and relocation grew the most rapidly.\textsuperscript{lxxxi}

The labor scarcity of the 1940s and 1950s, generated by solidarism in combination with robust demand and complementary macroeconomic policy, was the underlying cause of ALMP. (Restrained solidaristic wage policy made it possible to pursue relatively non-inflationary full employment policies; ALMP was designed to make it even easier to reconcile price stability and full employment.) Employer leaders complained of continuing “overfull employment” and a “disturbing degree of competition over labor among companies.” Wage drift threatened “bankruptcy for the bargaining system.” In shipbuilding major companies routinely evaded solidaristic controls by contracting out work to firms paying wages above what VF and SAF allowed in order to get profitable work done. Even the LO leadership joined in criticism of the practice. One shipbuilder complained of “a lack of balance between demand and supply in the labor market.” The situation was so untenable, he said, that there were only two logical choices available: let wages loose or ration labor.\textsuperscript{lxxxii}

In other words, to put it succinctly, administered pricing of labor inevitably spawned the idea of administrative rationing. ALMP partially served that purpose. As a labor allocation device, it clearly serviced the needs of industry arising in a system of their own making that generated labor scarcity and attending “disloyal” pay, benefits, and recruitment practices. In a vivid first-hand account of efforts to promote active labor market policy from the late 1940's through the 1960's, LO economist Gösta Rehn never mentions employer opposition. According to his writings in the 1950's, the main objective was to set up "permanently increased efforts to stimulate the adaptation of manpower to industry's needs."\textsuperscript{lxxxiii}
Rehn also modestly dismissed the idea that he and other LO economists' invented the idea of mobility measures, for "such demands come from outside" the trade union movement. By this he could only have meant from employers.\textsuperscript{lxxxiv} He and his fellow economist Rudolf Meidner certainly got little support from the Social Democratic government. Their report about active labor market policy, which was adopted as official policy by LO’s 1951 congress, struck Social Democratic Finance Minister Per-Edvin Sköld, as "the dumbest thing I've read (\textit{det dummaste jag läst})."\textsuperscript{lxxxv} Around the same time, the Social Democratic government actually proposed reducing the existing rather small AMS budget. SAF came to its defense.\textsuperscript{lxxxvi} Only later in the 1950s did the party leadership come around; as with the previous reforms discussed, union and employer and union views seemed to converge earlier than union and party views. A labor movement consensus did not overwhelm capitalist opposition.

Thus it is necessary to reexamine Esping-Andersen’s view that ALMP "was only possible due to the extraordinary labor market powers of the union movement".\textsuperscript{lxxxvii} For ALMP was by far SAF’s favorite Social Democratic reform. In various publications of the 1960's, SAF’s executive director Curt-Steffan Giesecke claimed that "There has long been a high degree of unity regarding labor market policy in our land." The reason for agreement, he said, lay in the “great shortage of trained manpower.” As regards state-industry relations, he said, "few areas are more crucial for government efforts than this particular one." In short, it was "extremely desirable from industry's viewpoint" that more resources should flow into ALMP.\textsuperscript{lxxxviii}

And flow they did, increasing to about 2% of GNP and 6% of total government budgets in the 1970s. Active supply-side programs like retraining and relocation grew the most rapidly, reaching nearly 40% of total spending by labor market authorities in 1982 from only a few per cent before 1960.\textsuperscript{lxxxix} No wonder then that the corporatist administration of the labor market department -- by a labor market board consisting of three employer representatives sitting together with labor’s representatives -- operated with so little friction during the 1960s and even into the 1980s. (The
extensive public day care services of the 1960s onwards, designed to bring women into the labor force, was also heartily endorsed by employers, who had begun calling for expansion in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{x}\textsuperscript{v}) The labor market policy harmonized so well with employer objectives in solidaristic governance of labor markets that late into the 1960s, according to one of SAF’s negotiators, labor market policy was “employers’ ally.” One SAF official characterized bourgeois party attempts to discredit the Social Democrats’ labor market policy as "entirely against our interests."\textsuperscript{x}\textsuperscript{xi}

*Power Outage and Therefore Reform Breakthrough?*

The alignment of capitalist and labor interests in Swedish welfare state developments of the 1940s and 1950s surely explodes all myths about how a shift in the “balance of class power” brought about the Swedish welfare state. The Swedish case thus calls into question similar unexamined assumptions about class interests and power in America, thereby lending further plausibility to the cross-class alliance argument developed earlier. A final step in the argument is to examine the relative analytic and evidentiary merits of an important argument formulated in direct contention with the cross-class alliance view.

The recent effort by Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, continues in the tradition of historical institutionalist arguments mustered to deny the importance of capitalist interests in the New Deal. To recall: Hacker and Pierson reason that business power in America, structurally enhanced by state-level domination of social policy making, was neutralized by the political consequences of the Great Depression. The shift of social politics to the federal level, because of huge Democratic party electoral victories, delivered capital a severe blow to its power and therefore gave reformers a window of opportunity to pass breakthrough legislation like the Social Security Act.\textsuperscript{x}\textsuperscript{cxi}

Most emphatically, they insist, a “massive decline in business power,” not a change of interests, explains the development. In challenging the cross-class alliance argument, they also attempt to re-explain one of its important pieces of evidence: that the American business community, by and large, supported the Social Security Act shortly after its passage. According to Hacker and Pierson, the fact that
businessmen actually came around to supporting the SSA had to do with consequences of the legislative design that were essentially non-regulatory in nature, dependent on subsequent corporate tax legislation, and, most importantly, anticipated by neither reformers nor corporate America until after passage and implementation.  

The Hacker-Pierson version of the capitalist power blackout and reformist looting thesis merits special attention here because it suggests a potential and rather elegant solution to the comparative-historical puzzle introduced at the beginning. They might argue that socialistically minded Swedish Social Democrats could not even pursue relatively modest reform because of Sweden’s small size and international exposure. In other words, they were powerfully hemmed in by the punitive structural power of capital in international markets. Thus they may were able to do far less than the more moderate, business-financed New Dealers in the 1930s in a large country mostly sheltered from international competition.

So far, perhaps, so good. But Sweden’s international exposure, certainly in the realm of trade, only increased in the postwar period, and more rapidly than America’s, as its welfare state assumed its modern shape and proportions. Hacker and Pierson might counter, however, that trade is not the key issue. Instead it is capital mobility. Sweden, they would likely add, heavily controlled capital flows – as did many countries in the post-war Bretton-Woods order -- the better to pursue autonomous macroeconomic, investment steering (especially into housing), and welfare policies. But an exclusive focus on capital movement of this nature would be misguided. For politicians, Swedish ones in particular, the movement of price-competitive traded goods is no doubt as immediate and powerful a punitive mechanism as capital flows, if not more powerful. Hence, with competing comparative analyses focusing rather abstractly on the structural power of capital, we can only reach a stalemate at best. We must turn, therefore, to the more empirical components of the Hacker-Pierson argument dealing with temporal development in the United States alone.

*Strategic Talk and Real Interests.* Hacker and Pierson try to clear the way for their argument about
the shifting balance of power against capital with three important assertions. First, that the New Dealers could not have been sensitive to capitalist power and interests because almost all organizational, and therefore publically vocal manifestations of capitalist preferences were negative regarding the SSA, especially from multi-sectoral organizations like the National Organization of Manufacturers and the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, but also numerous others. Second, that those few prominent capitalists who expressed sympathy for reform did so only to be invited into deliberations about the legislation, and thus to be in a position to make it as benign as possible. They were “driven by fear” – i.e., of less attractive alternatives. Third, they argue that capitalists and their IRC experts brought into deliberations did not get their way on various details, and that it is hard to find specific features of the SSA with their stamp on them.

On the first point -- regarding widespread capitalist opposition -- Hacker and Pierson bring no new evidence to the debate that Theda Skocpol and her collaborators -- originators of this objection to analyses tying capitalists to the New Deal -- have already offered. Nor do they confront the strong and detailed criticism that these old assertions about the unbroken wall of business opposition to the New Deal has already come under. That criticism needs no repetition here. Of course, from the standpoint of the present argument, the actual distribution of manifest business preferences before legislation was passed is neither knowable nor entirely relevant. (Had there been absolutely no discernable interest-based support, though, that would be a problem.) Politicians took action in anticipation of broad support after passage, based on a sophisticated understanding of underlying interests, not current expressed preferences. As we will see, politicians had good reason to regard these public preferences, organizationally filtered and strategically uttered, with skepticism. The third point -- the insiders’ failure to win on various details -- we can immediately skip over, regardless of its relative flaws or merits, because it constitutes a critique of a crude instrumentalist argument (direct but behind-the-scenes control), not the one advanced here.

The most interesting and important of these three arguments is the second one. Hacker and Pierson forcefully argue that any individual capitalists who spoke in favor of reform were strategically
exaggerating their support for government action and therefore real preferences for exclusively private, voluntary action. They did so in order to be brought into the reform process in the hopes that they would then be in a better position to influence the legislation, and thus make it as benign as possible. Confidence in this claim can be rather easily shaken.

Threats of legislation were not on the horizon in 1927, when the National Civic Federation, an organization of major businessmen, trade unionists, and civic leaders recommended compulsory old age insurance for wage workers.\textsuperscript{xcviii} Gerard Swope published his plan in 1931, which would have empowered sector-specific trade associations of interstate businesses to turn to the federal government to extend enforcement of their own – better -- standards on non-members if they were unable to do so on their own, well in advance of massive Democratic victories and serious legislative threats. In fact, he wrote it while Herbert Hoover was still president. In 1932, with no legislation looming, Henry Harriman, President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, said that if businesses were not able to control themselves, compulsion may be necessary to regulate competition. In that spirit, he wrote, “we must place upon business the responsibility for setting up reserves to tide over periods of unemployment and to assure men against economic want and suffering because of sickness, accident, or old age.” By “accident” Harriman was referring to long-term disability, and there was no legislative activity brewing on that.\textsuperscript{xcix} In 1933, still before any kind of radical legislation was a threat, Rockefeller’s attorney and close advisor (and FDR friend), reported glowingly to a presumably appreciative John D. Rockefeller, Jr., on IRC activities promoting and administering social insurance reforms.

With their emphasis on strategic talk, Hacker and Pierson claim to have improved the interpretation of evidence in power analysis by taking into account the role of “anticipated reactions” in the class politics of social policy. Supposedly, corporate progressives like Swope, whose support for government action became stronger over time, anticipated a worse outcome from speaking the truth than chameleon behavior to fool the administration. Their only direct evidence for this, a “smoking gun” as it were, is a speculative statement by Robert Lund, Chairman of NAM, speaking on unemployment.
insurance. Lund, claiming to speak for other businessmen in FDR’s mostly progressive Business Advisory Council, chided them for signaling interest to FDR while at the same time giving Lund the impression they did not “believe in” unemployment insurance.6

Lund’s protestations must, however, be taken with a large grain of salt. His recent takeover of the NAM leadership was paid for with contributions from people like the iron-fisted Tom Girdler of Republic Steel, responsible for Chicago’s “Memorial Day Massacre” of picketing and picnicking workers two years later. How candid and non-strategic, we might ask, were other capitalists in giving their opinions to the leader of a radicalized organization like the NAM (whose members were actually only a small share of American manufacturers), that might give them, as corporate progressive Edward Filene put it, a “reputation for radicalism that hampers them for further influence in business circles”?c

Reasons for reticence and strategic disinformation between capitalists probably varied quite widely. Many would have feared what Filene learned first-hand, that the openly liberal businessman risks a lonely life and “brings down upon his head the criticism of important groups of his fellow business men.” Hard-line circles spoke of Swope, for one, as a “dangerous man for industry” for his political activity and declaring the NAM unnecessary. His wife, “a former pal of Jane Adams [sic] of the Hull House, is active with him in their parlor pink activities,” one top East coast union buster complained.cii Not many businessmen relished standing up against such criticism as Swope and Filene did.

Compare Lund’s perceptions with those of J. Douglas Brown, respected in corporate circles as one of the country’s most sophisticated experts on company benefits. In a letter to Edwin Witte, Brown recounted that during the February 1935 annual conference of the American Management Association he had a chance to present the old age insurance plan as currently formulated “to a large number of industrial relations executives.” Their reaction, he said, was “very favorable.”ciii Whether there was strategic disinformation going on here must be doubted, be it between the executives and Brown or Brown and Witte. Certainly the executives were not angling to be invited into the deliberative process in order to make bad legislation less noxious. For reasons connected to the controversial Clark amendment to the SSA
(see below), there is strong reason to think their favorable reaction was based on well-informed self-interest – informed, that is, by Brown.

Attention to strategic political talk in power analysis is all for the better. But Hacker and Pierson’s application of the insight is one-sided and therefore imputes great clarity and certainty where none exists. Not willing to be deceived by businessmen taking progressive stands, Hacker and Pierson are willing, on the other hand, to take at face value all outspoken opposition from others. In doing so they neglect to explore the distinct possibility, posited Sanford Jacoby, who argues that capitalists in the National Industrial Conference Board, for example, were pursuing a “calculated strategy” in exaggerating their opposition to the SSA, not their support. Jacoby thinks they wanted to punish FDR for other things.

Because Hacker and Pierson are unwilling to apply strategic analysis to anyone but corporate liberals, they in effect -- if not explicitly -- endorse the equivalency premise. The equivalency premise says capitalists’ interests are threatened by the welfare state. Thus if capitalists express support we must investigate strategic motives, not direct interests; when they oppose it, we can comfortably take them at their word. Along with historical and comparative evidence against the premise, there is also an a priori reason, in fact, to think that outspoken and exaggerated opposition in some cases may have been strategic. In other words, even businessmen who looked rather favorably upon legislation would have been best to express opposition to make the New Dealers extra cautious in crafting it. This would apply especially for businessmen who had no time or desire to be brought into the deliberative and legislative crafting process - i.e., the organizational leaders cited so often as sincere opponents. It would be a perfectly rational tack in any bargaining situation where moving in the direction of the other party is a favored outcome, which the interest analysis suggests is a possibility -- but only up to and not beyond a certain point.

If there is any uncertainty about how far beyond that point the deciding party would go if real preferences were revealed, then vocal opposition may well be rational. This would certainly be the case when the deciding party is moderate and shares very similar preferences with their putative opponents but also must listen to more radical constituents and advisors. The offering of feigned opposition may actually
give moderates a welcome scapegoat and pretext for moderation.

If scholarly power analysis should skeptically dissect strategic utterances of all sides from many angles, it should by the same token attribute to the real practitioners of power analysis – politicians that is -- the same and probably superior ability to interpret strategic talk. Evidence suggests that the New Dealers in fact perceived pervasive division, uncertainty, and even mutual fear among businessmen and their organizations, moved and dominated and as they were by ideologies and ideologues. In the case of unemployment insurance, as prominent social insurance reformer Isaac Rubinow put it, "Individual employers are found to be much more ready to express their acceptance of [unemployment insurance] proposals in private." When asked for open endorsements, however, "They prefer 'to have their name kept out of this.'" 

FDR thought, for good reason, that American business organizations like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce misrepresented business interests in opposing the SSA. So did his “brains truster” Raymond Moley, a good friend of big business and coiner of the term “New Deal.” Moley argued that businessmen were as demagogically manipulable as anyone else. Kodak’s CES advisor Marion Folsom viewed the NAM, also a strong opponent of the SSA, as an organization with low quality leadership and inept staff. Not surprisingly, then, Witte brought in much higher quality experts from elsewhere in the business world -- the Rockefeller-financed IRC., in particular – which had already proved their worth in Wisconsin.

Domhoff brings to light suggestive evidence that Rockefeller would have been hesitant to attach his controversial name to New Deal legislation, preferring to delegate influence to other people, and thus besmirch the enterprise in the eyes of reformers on the left. In a 1930 letter to Rockefeller, his son declared it would be “fatal” to have J. Douglas Brown, later a key CES advisor, known as a “Rockefeller man.” Brown’s Princeton salary was being paid directly by Rockefeller; therefore John D. Rockefeller 3d thought the family’s endowment to the university’s Industrial Relations Section should be increased so that the salary come out of university funds. Here again, we can plausibly impute strategic talk, in the form of strategic silence, but for different reasons than Hacker and Pierson suppose.
Thus while Hacker and Pierson only examine capitalists’ strategic behavior, and only one-sidedly, they neglect to analyze the strategic thinking of political reformers. In particular they neglect to consider politicians’ strategic anticipation of capitalists’ reactions in the future, based on their knowledge from the past about business interests and behavior before and after reforms, including possibly, strategic exaggeration of opposition. Strategic behavior also included personnel choices. Roosevelt and Frances Perkins chose a good many Wisconsinites like Witte to work for the CES -- the same ones for example, who had calculated that their state’s unemployment insurance plan, according Nelson’s meticulous study, would “win the approval of the progressive employers.” Initially they failed to generate open approval, but in the end, the Wisconsin employers became enthusiastic promoters.\textsuperscript{viii} Witte, in turn, the “cautious reformer” from Wisconsin, brought in the country’s leading experts closely tied to leading segmentalists: IRC’s Bryce Stewart -- for unemployment insurance; IRC’s Murray Latimer, “Rockefeller man” Brown from Princeton, and not least AT&T actuary Otto Richter -- for OAI. Skimmed from the top of the barrel, these were probably some very wise choices from a strategic standpoint.\textsuperscript{cix}

*Anticipated Support after Passage.* As mentioned above, there is good evidence from earlier reform episodes that politicians were familiar with a pattern of initial business opposition and later support after passage. Hacker and Pierson do not acknowledge and challenge the evidence for a thorough treatment of the strategic interaction issue.\textsuperscript{cx} They do, of course, take note of major capitalists’s support for OAI after passage, which reformers, the current argument suggests, anticipated for regulatory reasons. According to their alternative explanation, employers only gradually discovered large advantages over time in “integrating” their company retirement plans with the compulsory system. What “integration” meant is that for the many significant firms with voluntary plans it meant eliminating or reducing their current payments for blue-collar workers. Why it proved desirable is no mystery, as indicated earlier: it saved them money, some of which, if they wanted, could be put into improving benefits for white-collar and supervisory employees. However, Hacker and Pierson claim, it is “doubtful” that these advantages were as “confidently foreseen” by the New Dealers as the cross-class alliance argument indicates.\textsuperscript{cxi}
Hacker and Pierson find evidence for their doubt in a book published by Edwin Witte the year after the SSA’s passage. Witte wrote that the CES paid “relatively little attention” to existing company pension plans in fashioning OAI. The implication they find here is that the administration was strategically unconcerned. They neglect to mention, however, what Witte wrote next, in virtually the same breath. Relatively little effort was spent because J. Douglas Brown and Murray Latimer took the trouble involved to talk to “some of the men in charge of personnel relations in several large companies.” In the process the two experts confirmed that the employers “would not object” to the plan as currently conceived, even if it did not include “special provisions for employers with existing industrial pension plans.”

A letter to Witte from Brown on the subject is especially illuminating. First Brown found among a “large number” of executives at the February 1935 American Management Association conference a “very favorable attitude” to the OAI plan. This is not surprising, considering that it was going to cost them 33 to 100 percent less than a private plan for the same benefits to their employees -- mostly because the benefits for their many workers about to retire would far exceed they could pay into a private system (“unearned annuities”). He then talked with “a number of key men” among them about letting companies maintain their own plans in order to skip paying social security taxes. What he discovered was that they “understood entirely the fact that contracting out is of decidedly doubtful advantage to their companies.” One of the companies was AT&T, whose actuary, Otto Richter, assisted Brown and Latimer in the CES.

No doubt the same findings had been included in a February 1 “memorandum to clients” of the IRC, which stated that “the combined cost to companies of the revised company plan and the national plan would presumably be less than the cost of their present plans.” In early August 1935, shortly before Congress passed the Social Security Act, he talked to “scores” of executives from large corporations and found “never even a wishful thought” for an amendment to the SSA to allow contracting out. If, as Witte wrote, members of the OAI staff “always made light of possible opposition” from companies with their own plans, it was not out of strategic carelessness or ideologically motivated indifference. It was based on deep, first-hand knowledge of employer interests.
This brings us to the Clark opt-out amendment, whose inclusion in the SSA held up the bill in Congress but was finally dropped at FDR’s insistence, and possibly (Brown wondered) because corporate executives helped break the logjam.\textsuperscript{cxvii} It was easily sent into permanent oblivion the following year when reintroduced. Pressure for the amendment, Brown and the IRC people knew, came mostly from a major broker in the insurance industry who doggedly mobilized support mostly from relatively small companies they sold group policies to -- but few large segmentalists.\textsuperscript{cxviii} (Most large employers, most of whom had some kind of plan, were “self-insured.”) Apparently, after numerous executives from bigger companies figured out the economic disadvantages of opting out, a well-informed observer noted, “I doubt if any campaign for a major amendment to a law ever collapsed as swiftly as that for the Clark amendment.”\textsuperscript{cxix}

Even Kodak’s Folsom, whose initial advocacy of the Clark Amendment had only been “lukewarm” (as he put it later), came around quickly to the view that it was worse than unnecessary -- it would also be a regulatory mistake. As he explained in a 1936 issue of the *Harvard Business Review*, in practice, only companies with a young workforce would have found the Clark exemption advantageous. Many of these would be new entrants or existing nonsegmentalist competitors. Their “selection against the Federal plan” would make it more expensive for large segmentalists with low turnover, and therefore with older unproductive workers now ready to retire, to fund the system adequately. Social Security taxes would then have to be higher. In other words, it would give back the regulatory advantage over competitors that the segmentalists had just gained. Thus, Folsom, one of the country’s leading corporate progressives, opposed giving other capitalists a free market choice.\textsuperscript{cxx} He was a capitalist against markets -- some markets at least -- and for compulsory social insurance.

To sum up: We have documentary proof that the CES knew of the overall benefits of OAI for big employers as early as February 1935, just after the administration bill had been submitted to Congress, and six months before SSA passage. We do not know -- yet -- if the facts were known during the drafting process between September 1934 and January 1935. Nothing suggests that they could not have been, for the CES experts -- including Latimer, Brown, but notably also Otto Richter, the actuary from AT&T -- had
the facts they needed at their fingertips. More important, they also had a strong motive to see what the fallout would be for the kinds of employers that had paid them in the careers that got them where they were. We know they did go to great trouble to assemble the facts for external enlightenment once opponents shoved the Clark amendment in the way before passage and, then, made it clear that they would reintroduce it the following year. Then it became necessary to clarify for big corporate employers that the amendment was against their interests. That was the IRC’s job, which it completed in August, at the time of passage, in a report showing that for, major employers, “the dollar for dollar benefits of the federal system cannot be matched by any private carrier.”

It is fascinating, but not surprising, that less than three days after President Roosevelt signed the SSA, the IRC announced to clients that it was “now engaged in the formulation of several types of private plans which will supplement the pension benefits provided under the federal scheme and more adequately cover employees in the higher salary brackets.” The IRC, with its administration insiders on government salary, clearly had a head start on competing consultants in showing companies how they should restructure their finances. Companies like Kodak could now cut back on their private expenditures for blue-collar workers, top off benefits for the higher-paid, and break even. The more competitively threatened International Harvester would know it could now more cheaply retire its workers while its competitors without previous plans would be hit with entirely new tax costs.

This is exactly the kind of “integration” that Hacker and Pierson portray as at best only a dimly perceived possibility until well after the SSA’s passage. In fact key people in the Roosevelt administration paid a great deal of attention to the issue because they were fully knowledgeable and confident of its enormous economic significance for politically important employers. They were not acting as if they had carte blanche for radical reform because capitalists had suffered a “massive loss of power.” They were acting as if they had very good reason for optimism about a supportive cross-class alliance after passage.

Institutional Determination of Interests. Another intriguing part of the Hacker-Pierson argument
concerns the institutionally conditioned power shift associated with the Depression, and it deserves extended discussion. True, policy making did shift to the federal level, and this had enormous consequences. Hacker and Pierson believe so because capital mobility could no longer check majoritarian reformist pressures as it had once done at the state level. But, unfortunately for Hacker and Pierson, their implicit ceteris paribus does not hold. For capitalists’ interests were different at the federal than state level. Furthermore, their interests in federal-level regulation were heightened by the Depression. Hacker and Pierson do not examine these possibilities, despite the broad consensus among historical institutionalists like them that interests as well as power are conditioned by institutions.

Before the Depression, as Hacker and Pierson point out correctly, capitalists often stood to lose from state-level regulations and taxation that might give out-of-state competitors an advantage. (In the case of the country’s first important social insurance reforms, workmen’s compensation, there was actually support for state legislation, but supporters thought it would bring savings and therefore competitive advantage, not extra costs.) However at the federal level, the story is radically different. Although there is plenty of dispute on the details, all important scholars of business in American politics find heavy business activity in the design of pre-1930s federal regulation. Often business interests sought national regulation of other sectors, as shippers, merchants, farmers, and other businessmen did over railroads. The movement, backed also by some railroads, culminated in the Hepburn Act of 1906, which strengthened the Interstate Commerce Commission’s power to control railroad shipping rates. Sometimes the leadership of business organizations did not always accurately reflect membership opinion -- a phenomenon that, we have seen, shows up again during the 1930s. For example, a survey of the NAM membership showed that a majority rejected the NAM leadership’s position, and supported strengthening the ICC. Broad-based business support within the NAM, even including some in the food industry unhappy with state level legislation, also overruled the association’s leadership on the question of food and drug legislation. The NAM’s Pure Food Committee, siding with the majority against the leadership, claimed a large share of credit for the 1906 food and drug legislation.
As railroad and food regulation indicates, capitalist interest in federal regulation extended even to
the matter of controlling one’s own sector, not just other sectors. Historian Robert Himmelberg shows that
the decade of the 1920s witnessed a long tug-of-war between the sectoral trade association movement
seeking exemption or revision of anti-trust laws and opponents like Herbert Hoover, first as Secretary of
Commerce under President Calvin Coolidge, and then as President. Hoover was a strong believer of
industry self-regulation to uplift standards, promote efficiency and innovation, and stabilize competition,
but consistently rejected large numbers of national trade groups’ argument that administrative or
legislative relaxation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was needed to make self-regulation effective. But
even Hoover agreed with businessmen on the need for some compulsory national-level regulation,
especially in hyper-competitive and struggling resource industries like bituminous coal and oil, where cut-
throat competition and therefore chiseling on prices and wages was rampant. He even favored negotiated
cartelism, and therefore a strong national labor union, as an institutional mechanism for regulating bruising
competition in coal mining. cxxv

If capitalist interests in regulation at the national level differed from their state level interests, they
also became more urgently pro-regulationist with the onset of the Depression. According to Ellis Hawley’s
authoritative account, the idea of self-government of industry “moved rapidly to the fore” as the economy
crashed. Thus “businessmen turned increasingly to the idea of government-supported cartels . . . [and]
production quotas, price agreements, entry controls, and cost-accounting formulas.” Businessmen believed,
Hawley writes, that these would facilitate calculations of the “right price” whose federal imposition
“would wholly and permanently eliminate unfair price cutting” and “promote an unequaled degree of
stability in all phases of industrial and economic affairs.” cxxvi According to Robert Himmelberg’s equally
important account, “this business crusade, or movement, began as World War I ended and extended
through the ‘20s, grew in intensity during the early Depression years of the Hoover presidency, and
triumphed in 1933 by persuading the nation, and the new administration of Franklin Roosevelt, that a
cartelized economy offered a way out of the Depression.” cxxvii
At the outset, passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933 handed over to capitalists an almost unhampered right to devise codes of fair competition, impose price floors, restrict production, and the like. Thus the National Recovery Administration (NRA) proceeded more or less exactly as the trade association movement wanted. Businessmen and their association lawyers were heavily engaged in both the drafting of the legislation and served as code authorities (especially industry level deputy administrators of the NRA). The NAM’s model code fairly “bristled with provisions for controlling prices and output,” as Hawley puts it, and a number of trade association spokesmen “made it plain that they hoped to imitate the practices of European cartels.” Business support for the NRA start to wane somewhat only after farmers, consumers, labor groups, Senators (especially progressive Republicans Borah and Nye), and diverse government agencies like the FTC, the Department of Agriculture, and the PWA began to countermobilize and force the NIRA to override business input.

So business interest in regulation at the federal level was an enduring and now, in the Depression, intensifying phenomenon. In 1919, both the NAM and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce had called for revision of anti-trust policy to allow collective self-regulation through trade associations. Throughout the 1920s, the business press railed against the destructive forces of competition -- but only the “excessive” portion of it, of course; at the beginning of the Depression, large numbers of businessmen trooped to Washington to support regulation. While the NIRA was in force, business cries of indignation ultimately blocked executive efforts to scotch the widespread use of open-pricing arrangements in industry codes, a technique that proved highly effective in fixing prices. When NIRA extension looked in doubt in May 1935, 1,500 businessmen rallied in Washington for its continuation. After the Supreme Court sent NRA bureaucrats packing, “there was still considerable support for publicly sanctioned cartelization,” according to Hawley.

Thus in passing OAI, as the NIRA indicates, the New Dealers, acting at the federal level, were responding to different and intensified regulatory interests, not a new balance of power against capital associated with the Depression crisis. They were also acting out of optimism that a cross-class alliance of
interests would make the legislation politically robust. The same optimism had animated Robert Wagner, who piloted the NIRA through Congress, and persuaded a reluctant Franklin Roosevelt to give the thing a try. Labor did not support the NIRA only for its paragraph 7(a), which affirmed their right to organize. As Hawley notes, prominent labor leaders John L. Lewis and Sidney Hillman thought it illogical to expect “a chaotic and overly competitive industry, one that was almost chronically depressed, to pay decent wages.” Matthew Woll, the American Federation of Labor vice president, favored antitrust revision as a way to guarantee higher standards for workers, and arranged for AFL periodicals to spread the idea.

Cross-class alignment of interests is also evident in the fact that the National Civic Federation “brought leaders in both business and labor together and to agree upon some program of constructive legislation which will help to ameliorate the conditions that are bound to follow through enforcement of the Anti-Trust laws.” Speaking here was NCF anti-trust committee member Wheeler P. Bloodgood, an influential corporate and trade association attorney. Even the NAM’s general counsel James Emery touted cross-class interests in relaxing anti-cartel enforcement, in efforts to get passage of something like the NRA, saying that the “inability to make cooperative agreements with respect to hours of production” had resulted in “cutthroat competition, under-payment of wages, and demoralization of industry.” We therefore do not have to doubt the truth, though perhaps the compassion, in NAM president Robert Lund’s statement that industrial codes would offer “better protection of labor.” When the U.S. Chamber of Commerce trumpeted the NIRA as a “magna charta of industry and labor,” it was probably as much for shared regulatory motives as for the compromise inclusion of 7(a).

But the NRA was a train wreck from the standpoint of economic policy and politics. (Lack of state or administrative capacity, identified by Skocpol and Finegold, was not the problem.) Economically it accomplished about what many economists expected with the formation of cartels -- monopoly price increases, output restriction, and downward, not upward pressure on employment. The backlash of diverse forces, responding to both macro and microeconomic consequences, working through public opinion, Congress, inter-administrative conflict within the NRA and between it and other agencies, and finally, the
Supreme Court, brought it to an early end. Efforts to fix it in response to these raging pluralistic forces only made things worse by imposing “policy deadlock,” to quote Hawley, and deflating the business community’s initial enthusiasm. They weakened the NRA’s ability to enforce codes, which antagonized firms that were actually obeying them. They weakened the cartel-like performance of the codes, thus disappointing many initial business supporters. They lent growing political legitimacy to losers and therefore opponents in the business world who paid the monopoly rents instead of capturing them.

Finally, the gathering anti-NRA backlash forced the Roosevelt administration to assert more bureaucratic authority over and through code authorities, where businessmen and their lawyers initially had free reign. The wresting away of the NRA apparatus from businessmen meant a looming, potentially uncontrollable attack on capital’s carefully protected entrepreneurial sovereignty. This growing threat, of course, helped erode capitalist support for the NRA across the board. Ultimately, many of the politically important firms that stood to gain the most, often very large segmentalists that were part of the initial coalition for the NRA, began to suffer profound doubts. It had been those same doubts that made even Gerard Swope hesitate in supporting anything but arms-length government control over sectoral self-governance. Even big oil firms, some of the most vocal enthusiasts, began to lose interest, having discovered that evolving state-level regulation, coordinated across states, was proving perfectly adequate without the risks of bureaucratic intervention brought on by political and economic factors irrelevant to oil.

By comparison, the SSA was far superior politically and economically to the NRA, even as it performed a similar regulatory function. Hence its longevity. By using taxation instead of bureaucratic rule making for regulation, the SSA minimized threats to managerial and entrepreneurial sovereignty. (The remaining threat -- fiscal indiscipline and rising taxes -- was real, but less dangerous.) In the distributional and regulatory realm there was room for a robust cross-class alliance; across the control battlefield is where capital drew the line. Anxiety about capitalist prerogatives made otherwise NRA-friendly businessmen reluctant to resuscitate anything like the NRA after the Supreme Court put it out of
everyone’s misery; it did not mean they abandoned hope for national-level regulation.\textsuperscript{cxxxiv}

In sum, enforcing uniform social insurance costs across the board would, as people like Swope and Harriman and many others acknowledged -- an idea picked up on by Brains Truster and NRA enthusiast Adolf Berle -- had an anticipated effect similar to other regulatory controls. All three had contemplated including social insurance provisions in their early thinking about cartelist legislation. But it would not come with the same political disadvantages. It would not arouse consumer, agrarian, and other counter-constituencies to the same extent, if at all. It would not stir up the same internecine conflict within the business community and across code authorities that tormented the NRA.

Arms-length, indirect regulation through social insurance was also superior \textit{economically} as well as politically. As Wagner recognized, it would not eliminate competition, only displace it -- from the chiseling of wages and sweating of workers onto a search for innovative efficiencies in the use of well-treated labor.\textsuperscript{cxxxv} In sum, at the federal level, absent strong international competition, American capitalists stood to gain from domestic regulation in a way that could not have been guaranteed by erratic and uneven action from state legislatures and governors. The New Dealers were acutely aware of a change in capitalist interests associated with changing macroeconomic conditions and were able to take advantage of a shift in the institutional locus of decision making to the federal level. They knew enough from past experience, and present business sentiment, to take vocal opposition from business organizations with a large grain of salt. They expected capitalist support after the fact. Acting in anticipation of capitalist interest in regulation was a manifestation of capitalist power, not weakness. All this probably explains the Social Security Act better than a sudden loss of capitalist power.

\textit{Comparative Analysis: Interests, Institutions, and Power Analysis}

According to Peter Hall, in his touchstone analysis for comparative institutionalists, socio-economic institutions -- like institutions of labor market governance -- are “constructed out of political struggles,” and therefore, both “reflect” and “condition” the power of classes. Shifting balances of power
explain the evolution and differences in economic policy outcomes governing democratic capitalist countries. In this formulation there is some truth. Institutions and policies probably do sometimes change when leaders of conflicting classes reassess the costs of conflict and accept pacifying compromises of lesser cost. But the truth is limited, however, because institutions and policies often serve interests shared across class lines. They serve those interests by regulating competition, not just conflict. And, as we have seen, regulation of competition is not something capital and labor need to argue about; both can actually benefit. Thus, institutions and the policies they administer can be constructed out of cross-class alliances. Those that emerge after class struggle and compromise are less likely to endure.

Hall edges toward this position, and decidedly away from Esping-Andersen’s equivalency premise, in asserting that the structure of institutions like unions and employer organizations not only directly affect power balances. They can also influence “an actor’s definition of his own interests,” or “affect the interpretation [actors’] put on their own interests, and thus the direction of their influence.” Therefore, in principle, capitalists’ interests in welfare policies, which have an immediate governing influence on the labor markets they try to manage, might vary widely across nations. Logically, there might even be a virtual identity of interests between labor and capital generally, or more likely at different levels of aggregation and with different degrees of intraclass division.

By leaving open this possibility, Hall introduces a deep ambiguity with regard to his overarching balance of power proposition, which implies the systemic conflict Esping-Andersen explicitly assumes. The ambiguity in Hall’s analysis is justified by the complexity of history. Without a doubt, employer power exercised in class struggle in the United States and Sweden, be it through strikebreaking or lockouts, brought about and reinforced segmentalism and solidarism. Union power, with strikes, did the same in bringing about and maintaining workable negotiated cartelism in some American sectors. The motivations for these developments and their longevity always included, however, an alignment of regulatory interests across classes. John Kenneth Galbraith, for example, was compelled to set aside cartelist unionism in coal mining and clothing as an exception to his theory of “countervailing power,”
which supposedly better accounted for the rise of strong unions like the United Auto Workers. In coal and clothing, unions by contrast “assumed price- and market-regulating functions” that the industries relied upon, not being able to arrange it for themselves.\textsuperscript{cxxxviii}

But cross-class alliances rather than exclusively conflictual power relations operated even in the case of the American auto industry’s segmentalism, which in the post-New Deal period assumed a negotiated form, preserving and reinforcing the decentralization and attendant wage and benefit inequalities within the working class that members of the United Auto Workers’ Union have benefitted from. (From the standpoint of relative wages and benefits, it is better to be an American than a Swedish auto worker.\textsuperscript{cxxxix}) Negotiated segmentalism is also a profoundly important factor explaining the deep rootedness of the American system of employment-based welfare and the comparative weakness of political forces for national health insurance.

Likewise, Swedish history also shows it is no easy matter to untangle the complex historical interplay of power and interests in class relations, institutional development, and social politics. In Sweden, as probably elsewhere, labor’s power, however conceived and measured, evolved in part as a by-product of capital’s power and interests. Swedish unions strangely defied international trends by growing through the 1920s from 41% in 1920 to 63% in 1930 and thus became the world’s strongest labor movement.\textsuperscript{cxl} But this growth was not independent of the fact that the employer confederation, by its own assessment in the late 1920s, was "one of the most powerful combinations of industrial employers the world over." Even in 1934, shortly after the Social Democrats’ rise to power (and assistance to SAF in bringing militancy and high pay in the construction under control), employer officials boasted to each other that the lockout was still effective, wages and other things were well under control, if not even better than before, and that "the Swedish employer is still lord of his manor (herre i sitt eget hus)".\textsuperscript{cxli}

What made employers strong in a relational, indeed coercive, sense -- the lockout -- probably made unions strong too, but more in an organizational sense (measured by membership levels). Because the sweeping lockouts, used to construct the centralized institutions of solidarism from early on in the
century, hit workers whether or not they were union members. Because union membership guaranteed lockout support, many workers probably joined unions and paid their fees as premiums for lockout insurance. Thus the power of labor in Sweden, *conceived as power against capital*, cannot be measured by organization levels.

Similar problems arise with the use of electoral and parliamentary strength as a measure of labor’s power against capital. If vigorous growth of the welfare state in the 1940s and beyond was not entirely unrelated to the electoral or parliamentary power of labor in Sweden, it is because the coercive and other powers of capital may have been an original cause of both. The welfare reforms of the 1940s and 1950s strengthened the Social Democrats electorally, and because organized capital saw no interest in mounting a counteroffensive, helped secure them in power for enviably long periods of time. During the late take-off period of the Swedish welfare state, capitalists were more satisfied, it appears, than overpowered by social democracy.

Our understanding of political development in America can be illuminated by comparative analysis of this nature. It should keep alive an old but still fascinating and contentious controversy about capitalist power in the timing and shaping of this country’s peculiar welfare state. It also confirms that historical institutionalism, as Hacker and Pierson correctly argue, can add to our knowledge about capitalists as power factors in capitalist societies. But because power analysis requires interest analysis -- informed by understanding of markets -- sharpened by deeper analysis of strategic interactions among interested agents, institutionalism’s analytical and empirical content needs improvement along the lines suggested here.


iii. Marquis Childs, Sweden: The Middle Way (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936,1951), and This is Democracy: Collective Bargaining in Scandinavia (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1938). In his recent study, Edwin Amenta finds that, in 1938, “The American performance outpaced the efforts of Sweden, today’s world leader in social spending.” Bold Relief: Institutional Politics and the Origins of Modern American Social Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 5. Had Amenta counted “general” not just central government spending, he would have found that Sweden actually surpassed the United States modestly in terms of social spending as a percent of GDP (about 8.5% for Sweden, 6.3% for the United States) and almost matched it in total government spending as a percent of GDP (27.6% in Sweden, 29.4% in the United States). The source for Amenta’s and these calculations is Peter Flora et al.,


vi. Esping-Andersen, *Three Worlds*, 105-38. See also Esping-Andersen and Roger Friedland, "Class Coalitions in the Making of West European Economies," in *Political Power and Social Theory* 3 (1982), 17, 19, and 47, where they argue that the power of the left "is the key to the evolution of Sweden's postwar political economy." "More than in any other European nation," they argue, the "working class has been capable of initiating and imposing its policy preferences." Recent work continues in this vein, neglecting to theorize and research about interests in order to draw confident conclusions about the relative power of classes. See especially Evelyn Huber and John D. Stephens, *Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).


xiii. Thomas P. Ferguson presents a deeply problematic logrolling argument for capitalist support of the


xvi. Swenson, *Capitalists against Markets*, 146-60.


xviii. The term segmentalism is suggested by efficiency wage models of “labor market segmentation.” Jeremy Bulow and Lawrence Summers, "A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application to Industrial


x. Some literature seems to underplay the importance of workplace relational contracting in “liberal market economies” like the United States, implying that institutions external to the firm are required to bring it about, not the microeconomic rationality of efficiency wage behavior. See for example Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, “An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism,” in Hall and Soskice, eds., *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), especially 6-33.


xii. For these and more details on the rise of segmentalism, see Swenson, *Capitalists against Markets*, 49-60.


xxx. In other words, they worked within an agenda constrained by capitalist power. See Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (Hampshire, UK: Macmillan, 1974).

xxxiii. Raymond B. Fosdick to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., 27 April 1933. Box 16, Folder 127, Economic Reform [RG2COMRD], Rockefeller Archive Center (letter supplied to author by G. William Domhoff).


xxxvi. Possibly for regulatory reasons, though certainly for the sake of the budget, the reformers imposed a $15 limit on earned income to qualify for social security. Had they not done so, some workers over 65, involuntarily retired by segmentalists, might simply have stayed in the labor market to work for low-standard employers, possibly even their competitors, to supplement their limited retirement benefits. Substandard employers could then depress standards even further. Thus the government might have undermined the regulatory purpose of the new tax. Compare this with the Swedish system below. There, for clear regulatory reasons, all gainful employment was allowed without loss of benefits.


xlvii. Compression across firms and industries probably also pays off in efficiency because it prods employers into investment in labor-saving technology by inhibiting the expansion of output to meet demand by using wage increases to hire more workers using more of the old technology. By holding back wages at the high end it also subsidizes more productive newer vintage capital, thus accelerating a Schumpeterian process of creative destruction. See Karl-Ove Moene and Michael Wallerstein, “Pay Inequality,” in *Journal of Labor Economics* 15 (1997), 403-430; Wallerstein and Moene, “Solidaristic Wage Bargaining,” *Nordic Journal of Political Economy* 22 (1995), 79-94.

xlviii. Third, solidarists will seek to manage and ration the supply of labor by coordinating recruitment practices, including restrictions on open advertising and direct poaching, promoting the formation and use of labor exchanges or bureaus for deployment of idle workers and skills, and regulating or collectivizing vocational training. See Swenson, *Capitalists against Markets*, 33-34.
xlix. But there will be latent tensions if not open conflict within labor on control issues as a result. Egalitarian wage restraint means passing up opportunities to raise wages in highly profitable firms and sectors. For a discussion, see Swenson, *Fair Shares: Unions, Pay, and Politics in Sweden and West Germany* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), esp. chapters 4 and 5.


li. Evidence for this and following paragraphs can be found in Swenson, *Capitalists against Markets*, 77-82.


liv. More detail on this and the following can be found in Swenson, *Capitalists against Markets*, 82-90.


lvii. More on this and the following can be found in Swenson, *Capitalists against Markets*, 82-90.
Aubrey Clayton to Edström, 12 February 1907. Edström E21 [A3a/överstyrelsen]. Neither Metall nor the 1905 agreement blocked the apprentice solution; wages for apprentices were not regulated.

Low-pay sectors were particularly disturbed. For example some textile employers wanted to raise wages for fear of losing workers to higher-pay sectors like engineering. Engineering employers, frequently stealing workers from each other, dealt with the matter collectively by sharpening their rules against poaching. In some regions they agreed among themselves not to hire workers within a month of their departure from a fellow engineering employer. See for example SAF, Minutes, Styrelse,, 25 January, 22 March, 26 April, and 31 May, and 6 September 1945; SAF, Minutes, Ombudsmannakonferens, 26 September 1945.

SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 29 August 1946; Minutes, Ombudsmannakonferens, 18 November 1946.

SAF, Styrelse, 27 November 1946; Ombudsmannakonferens, 18 November, 1946; 16 December 1946.

On tight labor market conditions in 1947, see SAF, *Styrelse- och revisionsberättelser för år 1947*, 49-50. High level discussions into the 1950s regarding labor scarcity can be found, among other places, in SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 27 February, 28 August, and 30 October 1947; 26 August, 21 October, and 11 November 1948; 17 February and 15 September 1949; 23 May and 19 October 1950; 15 November 1951; 22-23 April, 16 September, 21-22 October, and 18 November 1954; 15 September 1955; 18 October 1956; 17 October and 25 April 1957. See also SAF, Minutes, Ombudsmannakonferens (Förbundsdirektörskonferens), 13-14 September 1954; 11-12 November 1957; and 15 September 1958; and SAF, Minutes, Arbetsutskott, 13 July 1955.


For more on this and the following, see Swenson, *Capitalists against Markets*, 260-65.

Fritjof Söderbäck, "Till Konungen", 23 January 1946. SAF A150 (18x). See also "Lag om folkpensionering/yttrande"; Socialvårdskommitténs Betänkande XI -- Utredning och förslag angående lag om folkpensionering (SOU 1945:46), 134-5. SAF accepted incomes-tested supplementary housing benefits for those in high-rent areas only because universalistic benefits would put too much strain on government finances. However, the 1934 deductibility rules for company pensions were preserved, as employers wanted.
Implementation of earlier legislation, passed in 1946 against SAF’s strong opposition, had been repeatedly postponed, until it was actually scrapped in 1951. The evidence indicates that among the Social Democrats’ second thoughts were SAF’s first: labor and materials shortages for hospital construction and personnel made it “impossible to implement.” SAF also strenuously objected to the first law’s flat-rate sick pay benefit, which was well above many rural incomes. This would have made it difficult for Swedish industry to continue attracting labor away from agriculture.


Erik Brodén, "Memorial, fört vid överläggning angående arbetarnas sjukförmåner," 2 June 1954. (Träindustriförbundet/Arbetarnas sjukförmåner, 1954 [yellow box with miscellaneous documents,
beginning with "Protokoll 1920").

lxxviii Sven Hydén . . . "Anteckningar från diskussion av SAF:s förslag till yttrande över socialförsäkringsutredningens betänkande om sjukförsäkring och yrkesskadeförsäkring", 10 January 1953 (SAF/A1350/22å-II); "PM angående sjukförsäkring" (by Sven Hydén), 17 October 1952. SAF 1350/22å/Svar från styrelseledamöter; Träindustriförbundet, Yttrande över förslaget till yrkesskadeförsäkring. TIF/Yrkesskadeförsäkring 1950-51 [Yellow box with miscellaneous items, starting with "Protokoll 1920"].


lxxx Torsten Svensson, Socialdemokratins dominans – En studie av den svenska socialdemokratins partistrategi (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1994), 201; 205; 225-27 and 236.

lxxxi ALMP’s administrative structures and even basic policies were actually introduced earlier, albeit on a limited scale, and with employer support in the 1930s and 1940s. See Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 277-79.


The conflict concerned what the LO economists regarded as the government's excessive reliance on traditional and rather clumsy expansionary macroeconomic policies to counteract increases in unemployment, while expecting the unions to exercise voluntary restraint on wages – even with unemployment dipping below 1%. Predictably, as in 1948, 1951, and 1955, the result was an explosion of wages and prices triggered by wage drift. Firms systematically violated centrally negotiated wage increases. Paying more than unions had settled for was of course deeply embarrassing to them, so they who would then rush in with militant demands to reclaim leadership in representing workers' interests. Rehn, "Finansministrarna, LO-ekonomerna och arbetsmarknadspolitiken, 234-37.

SAF objectied, for example, to eliminating AMS’s role in procuring nannies (hemvårdarinor) for families with two working parents. "It is of greatest importance, " SAF wrote, "that the potential manpower reserve consisting of non-gainfully employed women, is supplied to production." Yttrande, 8 February 1951 [SAF A7100(2u) Betr. den offentliga arbetsförmedlingens organisation].

Esping-Andersen and Friedland, "Class Coalitions in the Making of West European Economies," in Political Power and Social Theory 3 (1982), 17, 19, and 47.

Curt-Steelfan Giesecke, Stann-Anders och likheten: Inlägg i arbetsmarknadsfrågor (Stockholm: Albert Bonnier, 1968), especially 89-92; 100; 103.


xciii. Ibid, 309 (their emphasis).


xcv. If we turn to capitalists’ “instrumental” power (exercised in electoral financing, lobbying, and opinion making) the puzzle remains: given that the Democratic Party depended heavily on capitalist funds, why would the New Dealers have so brazenly defied capital? A recent work by Mark Smith suggests a possible answer consistent with the power outage argument. The contributions may have invested campaign contributions mostly for particularistic benefits (subsidies, regulations, and tax breaks) that both parties trafficked in. Thus capitalist money for Democrats was for other things than correct social policy. Even had the New Dealers defied unified capital in the social policy realm, they could have continued delivering all manner of particularistic advantages. They could reform with impunity, and the money would continue to flow. But it should be clear by now that it is wrong to starkly differentiate social welfare issues from particularistic ones. Social insurance reform was less a “unifying issue” (in Smith’s sense, uniting capitalists against reformers) than meets the eye. Mark Smith, *American Business...*


cvii. Domhoff, *State Autonomy or Class Dominance*, 131-32.


cix. Hacker and Pierson diminish the importance of G. William Domhoff’s revealing research on the IRC, relied on here, by mistakenly calling his claims “conspiratorial.” Unfortunately, they pay no attention to the strategic element in the personnel choices that no one else but Domhoff has so excellently illuminated. Hacker and Pierson, “Business Power and Social Policy,” 307-08.


cxiii. The other companies included U.S. Steel, Socony-Vacuum, Du Pont, U.S. Rubber, Union Carbide, Western Electric, and “a number of others.” Brown to Witte, 13 February 1935 and 23 February 1935. J. Douglas Brown Papers, Mudd Library, Princeton University. See also Domhoff, *State Autonomy or Class Dominance?*, especially 167-69, for evidence of big employers’ views on the Clark option.


cxv. J. Douglas Brown to Murray Latimer, 12 August 1935. Murray Latimer Collection, George

cxvii. In a letter to Latimer, Brown asks him how he broke the jam, and “did the attitude of the large corporations affect the decision[?]” Brown to Latimer, 12 August 1935.

cxviii. Brown to Witte, 13 February 1935. Within days after passage the IRC informed its segmentalist clients that “the long debate on this matter was due mainly to a misunderstanding of the issues on the part of some members of Congress and by a few industrial companies, as well as to the pressure from lobbying.” Industrial Relations Counselors, “Memorandum to Clients,” No. 14, August 16, 1935 (document generously supplied by G. William Domhoff).


cxx. Folsom, “Company Annuity Plans and the Federal Old Age Benefit Plan,” Harvard Business Review 14:4 (Summer 1936), 420. On “lukewarm” see Folsom quote in Rainard B. Robbins, Preliminary Report on the Status of Industrial Pension Plans as Affected by Old Age Benefits Sections of the SSA, 1936 (document generously supplied by G. William Domhoff from Rockefeller Archive Center). The adverse selection problem was already known, before passage of the SSA, by IRC/CES expert Latimer from the IRC. This may help explain Folsom’s earlier lukewarmness. Murray Latimer, “Memorandum on Proposed Amendments Permitting Employers with Private Pension Plans to Contract out of the Government System,” unpublished CES study, 1935 (www.ssa.gov/history/reports/ces/ces2latimer.l.html). See also economist Paul Douglas’s view that “the competitive advantage of young employees would enable such a firm to undersell competitors with older employees, and thus force the elimination of older employees or
their employment only on the condition that they join the federal plan. Rainard Robbins, “Preliminary Report,” 24.


cxxiii. “Dimly” because at one point, Hacker and Pierson say that the regulatory/cost-shifting effects of OAI were “partly anticipated.” Unfortunately they do not indicate what exactly was known, and how partly, in order to explain why the foreknowledge does not partly weaken their argument. They also explain business support for OAI arising because of later tax incentives for voluntary plans. For criticism of the anticipated cross-class alliance argument this is irrelevant; if anything it confirms the importance of cross-class alliances in American social policy. As the logic of negotiated segmentalism or “unionized welfare capitalism” would predict, employers and organized labor have benefitted from, and defended, tax expenditures on employment-based private welfare. To put it another way, the advantages of the tax breaks would have been wholly, not partly anticipated when introduced. Cross-class alliance making was an ongoing process. Hacker and Pierson, “Business Power,” 310-11.


cxxv. Robert F. Himmelberg, The Origins of the National Recovery Administration: Business,


cxxvii. Himmelberg, Origins of the National Recovery Administration, xiii.


cxx. Material in this and the preceding paragraph is from Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly, 26-28; Himmelberg, Origins of the National Recovery Administration, 81-83, 90-93, 111-14, 187, 202.

cxxi. It neither weakened the political will to install the NRA; nor can it tidily sum up except in a tautological way what happened afterward. See Theda Skocpol and Kenneth Finegold for the “state capacity” argument in “State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal,” Political Science Quarterly 97:2 (Summer 1982), 255-78. For critiques see Donald Brand, Corporatism and the Rule of Law: A Study of the National Recovery Administration (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 311, and Domhoff, State Autonomy or Class Dominance?, 56-72 and 101-16.


cxl. Axel Brunius, "De svenska arbetsgivarnas organisationsformer," draft of an article for *Chalmerska jubileumsskriften*, no date (probably 1929); Edström collection, Vol. 34 (A14d); SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 28 February 1934; Ivar Larson to Axel Palmgren, 13 February 1936, Axel Palmgren papers, Åbo Akademin, Åbo, Finland. On the construction conflict, see Swenson, *Capitalists against Markets*, 100-09.

cxliii. This conclusion applies to the major pension reform of 1959 as well, the income-linked general service pension (ATP), when employers, despite initial strong opposition, turned out to be happy with the final form the legislation took. See Swenson, Labor Markets and Welfare States, 281-92.