The Political Machine as an Organization

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This writing sample is truncated empirical chapter from my dissertation: "Making the Mare Go: The Internal Organization and Electoral Success of Political Machines."

Like many scholars who study clientelism, I argue that a party depends upon many brokers to make voters more responsive to targeted goods. By formalizing this argument and carefully considering the priorities of brokers, I develop a set of predictions regarding the internal organization of parties that diverges from the ways in which many scholars of both clientelism and political competition more broadly conceive of them. If parties are teams of actors who are unified around the goal of maximizing votes for their party, party members should be able to make a meaningful contribution to a party's victory, they should not bargain for resources and threaten to exit their party if they do not receive these resources and finally, party members should not compete against one another because they are all working towards the same goal. Instead, I predict that brokers will not be able to substantially affect their party's victory through their marginal contributions. I predict that party members will bargain for resources and utilize control over voters and the threat of exit as means to gain bargaining strength. Finally, I predict that party leaders will induce intra-party competition among brokers as a means to discipline them and extract effort from them.

I use original survey data of local political actors in Argentina to test the arguments regarding a party's internal organization that I have developed in chapter 2. The survey's sample is comprised of city council members and their brokers who were randomly selected from four Argentine provinces: Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Misiones and San Luis. By surveying a large number of local level political actors, the survey provides fine-grained data regarding the motivations of these actors, party structures at the municipal level and intra-party power struggles. To my knowledge

this survey is the first attempt to draw a probability sample of a party's network at the local level and provides an unprecedented opportunity to test theories regarding the internal structure of political machines.

The structure of this chapter broadly follows the structure of chapter 2. First I test if parties do in fact rely on large numbers of brokers. Next I test if these brokers can use the relationships that they have developed with voters to make voters more responsive to targeted goods. I find support for the arguments that political machines rely on large numbers of brokers and that these brokers provide valuable services for the party. I then test if parties that utilize brokers experience the organizational problems that the model predicts. First, I test if brokers can substantially affect the electoral outcome of their party through increases in their marginal efforts. Next I test if brokers bargain with party leaders. I test if brokers decrease their party's vote share through bargaining for resources and test if broker utilize control over their voters and exit options as a means to increase their bargaining strength. Finally, I test if brokers compete among one another. Broadly, the evidence supports my model's predictions and fundamentally challenges the conception of a party as a team of actors who are unified around the goal of winning elections for their party. The evidence suggests that parties are complex systems that enable party leaders to win elections, while allowing local actors to pursue more immediate goals.

1 Survey Design

The data used to test the model come from a survey that was conducted in Argentina during 2009 and 2011, in which 723 subjects were surveyed. The sampling frame consists of city council members and their brokers in four provinces: Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Misiones, and San Luis. In most of the analysis, I treat city council members as brokers because many city council members were previously brokers. Even as city council members they are local-level actors who organize relatively small groups of voters and are often responsible for only a portion of the voters within a municipality. However, city council members are hierarchically situated one tier above the brokers, which can be an important source of variation for some of the analysis. In Córdoba and Misiones all of the city council members and their brokers are in the sampling frame. In Buenos Aires we restricted the sampling frame to the Conurbano Bonaerense, which is comprised of 24 municipalities that surround Buenos Aires. We restricted the sample to focus on the municipalities that are known to have large party machines. Numerous studies (Stokes 2005; Auyero 2000; Levitsky 2003) note that the many politicians use large territorial organizations to mobilize voters in the Conurbano. In San Luis we excluded small villages ("comunas"). Table (1) shows the distribution of observations for each province.

Within the sampling frame we created a clustered random sample that is clustered by municipalities and city council members. Within the three provinces and the Conurbano the municipalities were randomly ranked on a list. City council members and their broker were then selected using the following method. Half of the city council members were randomly selected from the first municipality on the ranked

Table 1: Distribution of Respondents

Respondent Type	Buenos Aires	Córdoba	Misiones	San Luis
City Council	98	54	91	36
Broker	159	114	103	67

list.[1] After surveying each city council member, the city council member was asked to provide a list of their brokers. One-fifth or one-third[2] of the city council member's brokers were then randomly selected. When an interviewer completed the surveys in a municipality, this interviewer moved on to the next municipality on the list. Therefore, the sampling design is both clustered by municipalities as well as city council members.

Control over the sampling-frame of city council members eliminated selection effects for this population. Since city council members ultimately had discretion over the sampling frame for brokers, selection effects are a concern for the sample of brokers. However, we took steps to minimize the discretion that any of the city council members had in the selection process. Each city council member that we interviewed did not know we would be interviewing brokers before we asked her to provide the number brokers worked for her and that she knew by name. Moreover, these city council members did not know the random selection method of brokers before provid-

[1]Since interviewers simultaneously worked in municipalities we began randomly selecting half of the city council members from several municipalities at once. The selection of municipalities followed the order on the list.

[2]We selected one-fifth of the brokers in Buenos Aires and one-third of the brokers in the other provinces. This decision was based on the size of the lists, which tended to be longer in Buenos Aires. However, in the Buenos Aires municipalities of Malvinas Argentinas, Tigre and Ituzaingo one-third of the brokers were selected.

ing their lists. Brokers often contradicted their city council member and city council members often tried to persuade interviewers to select other brokers. These actions indicate that the city council members had less control over the selection process than a simple snowball sampling method. Despite these challenges, to my knowledge the sample is the first attempt to draw a probability sample of this population. The sampling method provides a representative sample of city council members in each province and a large sample of diverse brokers, which may suffer from a selection effect. Given the challenges for sampling brokers I report the results for city council members and brokers separately.

The sampling design merits several considerations for the analysis. Because we used cluster sampling the variance formulas based on simple random sampling are not appropriate. Second, we cannot assume i.i.d. sampling because we sampled without replacement and in some provinces our sample population is a large proportion of the population in the entire sampling frame. Finally, using the mean of the sample to estimate population means may generate ratio-estimator bias, because both the numerator and denominator of the sample statistics, such as the size of the sample, are random variables.

To address these challenges I utilize bootstrapped samples, which replicate the sampling method used in the survey but sample with replacement. For a given province the program first draws with replacement a sample of municipalities that has the same number of municipalities as the original sample. This sample is drawn taking the empirical sample, the real sample of city council members and brokers sampled in Argentina, as the bootstrap population. I use the empirical sample be-

cause it gives us our best guess regarding the parameter values in the true population of council members and brokers in the sampling frame. From each selected municipality, the program then draws with replacement a sample of city council members that has the same number of city council members as the municipality had in the original sample. Finally, from each city council member it draws with replacement a sample of brokers that is the same size as the city council member's number of brokers in the original sample. The program then takes the statistic of interest from the bootstrapped sample. It repeats this procedure 800 times recording the statistic of interest each iteration. Below I report the mean of the 800 statistics and their standard deviation is reported as the standard error.[3]

Finally, some questions in the survey have an experimental design. The treatment consists of different versions of these questions, which were randomly assigned. To randomly assign the treatments, we created four versions of the survey. Each surveyor started with version 1 of the survey and proceeded in numerical order with each subsequent interview. Because respondents were randomly selected, the survey version and attributes of the respondents are statistically independent of the survey version that they were assigned.

2 Analysis

In the model, parties experience organizational problems when they utilize targeted resources to win votes because they must rely upon a large number of individuals who

[3]See Stokes et. al. (2011) for a more complete description of the problems that this sampling design generates and the bootstrapping method that is used to analyze the data.

have significant organizing responibilities. A measure of the number of brokers that work for city council members shows that parties in Argentina utilize large networks of brokers.[4] In the survey, city council members were asked,

> *How many brokers work for you? Please name only those who you know by name.*

Although many accounts of clientelism depict large territorial organizations, to my knowledge this is the first data set that provides estimates the size of these organizations at the local level. Table (2) shows the estimated mean number of brokers for city council members in each province. The mean number of brokers working for council members range from nearly 30 brokers per member in Córdoba to about 12 brokers working per member San Luis. The variation in the size of a city council members organization likely reflects the population size of the council members' municipalities. In San Luis the towns were much smaller than Buenos Aires or Córdoba. Across the provinces city council members construct and manage large territorial organizations, which have the potential to generate collective action and principal-agent problems. Since city council members are numerous and are relatively localized officials, the large size of their organizes indicates that parties rely on many brokers. For example, a city council in the Conurbano can have up to 24 city council members. Moreover, the mayor and social movement organizations may also have independent networks of brokers who all work for political parties. Given the large number of brokers, their priorities and power of these individuals

[4] I do not present the data disaggregated among parties. Some parties might not rely on brokers at all.

Table 2: Mean Number of brokers who work for city council members

Province	Mean	Standard Error
Buenos Aires	22.9097	3.1987
Córdoba	29.3863	24.3958
Misiones	20.1981	3.3639
San Luis	12.0021	2.5012

should affect a party's strategy.

Brokers have significant organizing responsibilities because they make voters more responsive to targeted goods through a variety of means. With the survey data, I cannot not test if brokers make voters more responsive to targeted goods through every means postulated in the previous chapters, but the data allow me to test if brokers develop fine-grained knowledge of voters.

In the survey, city council members and brokers were asked the following question:

> *When a neighbor with whom you have a good relation votes for a candidate that you do not support, do you believe that you can tell that the voter voted in this way?*

One of the ways in which brokers make voters more responsive to targeted goods is that they make targeted resource distribution contingent by monitoring their voting behavior (Stokes 2005). Knowledge about voting behavior is the type of fine-grained knowledge that requires relationships and cannot be acquired by one individual on a large enough scale to win elections. Table (3) shows that brokers and city council members in every overwhelmingly claim that they can deduce the voting behavior of a voter when they have a good relationship with the voter. The frequencies of this

Table 3: Do you know if a voter voted against your candidate?

Respondent Type	Yes	No	Standard Error
Buenos Aires			
City Council Members	89.50%	10.50%	3.60%
Brokers	83.69%	16.31%	4.30%
Córdoba			
City Council Members	88.10%	11.90%	6.01%
Brokers	70.61%	29.39%	12.40%
Misiones			
City Council Members	80.64%	19.36%	5.95%
Brokers	76.11%	23.89%	5.83%
San Luis			
City Council Members	88.79%	11.21%	7.73%
Brokers	87.65%	12.35%	8.04%

response show that brokers can provide a valuable service for party leaders and it indicates that such knowledge will be acquired through personal relationships that are difficult to sustain on a large scale.

By building relationships with individuals brokers learn the political proclivities and real necessities of the voters that they organize. This knowledge allows brokers to avoid wasting resources. At a minimum, knowing the political proclivities of voters will allow brokers to avoid giving resources to individuals who would never support their candidate. Knowing the political proclivities of voters may also allow brokers to avoid giving a large share of resources to voters who will always vote for the party.[5] Knowing the real necessities of voters allows brokers to win more support by helping

[5]Other data in this survey shows that brokers often give resources to core voters. See Stokes, Dunning Nazareno, Brusco (forthcoming) for an explanation of this result

a larger number of people in need because they will not waste resources on voters who do not need them.

In the survey, city council members and brokers were asked the following question:

> *How difficult is it to distinguish those who would vote only if they receive a good from the people would vote anyway?*

Table 4: How difficult is it to distinguish between types of voters?

Respondent Type	Easy	Not Easy or Difficult	Difficult
Buenos Aires			
City Council	71.66%	11.12%	17.22%
	(6.43)	(5.38)	(5.78)
Brokers	76.05%	10.66%	13.29%
	(4.97)	(3.19)	(4.33)
Córdoba			
City Council	58.39%	22.02%	19.59%
	(9.54)	(8.82)	(8.10)
Brokers	64.17%	18.04%	17.80%
	(9.82)	(6.24)	(9.82)
Misiones			
City Council	68.48%	18.96%	12.57%
	(6.27)	(5.56)	(4.63)
Brokers	68.38%	10.47%	21.14%
	(6.18)	(5.02)	(5.68)
San Luis			
City Council	64.43%	14.60%	20.86%
	(9.13)	(6.87)	(8.54)
Brokers	63.09%	13.02%	23.90%
	(9.09)	(5.78)	(8.40)

Standard Errors are in parentheses and in percentage terms.

Table (4) shows that the majority of respondents in every province are confident that they can distinguish between different types of voters. Narrowly interpreted this question provides a measurement of a broker's ability make resources targeted and contingent. More broadly interpreted, it provides an additional measure of the fine-grained knowledge that a broker develops and his ability to efficiently use resources in exchange for political support. When asked how they can distinguish between these types of voters, the vast majority of respondents replied that either personal knowledge, daily interactions or conversation allowed them to distinguish between these types of voters. These kinds of daily interactions require substantial investments of time. Such investments limit the number of voters that a single individual can organize and require that brokers devote a substantial amount of time to their organizing activities.

2.1 Organizational Problems: The Brokers' Collective Action Problem

While the preceding evidence supports the argument that parties rely heavily on brokers, it also indicates that parties need a large number of brokers to invest a substantial amount of effort to acquire information and carry out activities that winning elections requires. Motivating this effort, then, is crucial for winning elections through the use of targeted and contingent resources. Before providing measures that measure a broker's priorities more directly, I will show that brokers who prioritize their party's victory will suffer from a collective action problem. A fundamental insight and prediction of the model in the preceding chapter is that targeted and

contingent resources give brokers intrinsic incentives to increase their marginal efforts towards helping their party win elections. In contrast, a party comprised of actors who simply participate in political activities to help their party win elections will not have the same incentives to increase their marginal efforts.

The model predicts that as the size of a broker's group decreases, the broker's marginal efforts to make voters more responsive to targeted goods will have less of an effect over the party's vote share. This result illustrates the collective action problem that brokers would face if they only prioritized their party's victory. The survey provides measures of the number of voters that each broker organizes. By comparing these measures with recent electoral data, I can test the likelihood that a broker's marginal efforts would effect an election.

In the survey we asked city council members and brokers the following questions:

> *Speaking of political rallies, approximately how many people would you say you can transport: less than 50 people, between 50 and 100 people, between 100 and 200 people, between 200 and 300 people or more than 300 people?*
>
> *Speaking of the day of the general election, would you say that the number of voters that you can transport is:much more, more, equal, less or much less than for political rallies?*

Tables (5) and (6) do not provide a direct numerical measure of the amount of voters that the respondents can mobilize for elections. However, the figures provide information about the mobilizational capacity of city council members and brokers.

Table 5: How many voters can you transport to a rally?

Respondent Type	> 50	50 to 100	100 to 200	200 to 300	> 300
Buenos Aires					
City Council	10.51%	17.72%	12.67%	16.86%	42.24%
	(4.11)	(4.44)	(3.92)	(6.17)	(7.62)
Brokers	32.84%	33.40%	16.41%	7.47%	9.87%
	(6.49)	(5.43)	(4.61)	(3.84)	(4.48)
Córdoba					
City Council	31.36%	25.50%	17.33%	8.12%	17.62%
	(8.44)	(11.12)	(7.17)	(4.64)	(12.51)
Brokers	21.07%	28.30%	12.77%	10.88%	26.99%
	(9.63)	(10.56)	(6.21)	(6.34)	(13.57)
Misiones					
City Council	14.13%	26.05%	13.35%	18.75%	27.72%
	(5.71)	(6.27)	(4.63)	(5.01)	(6.45)
Brokers	17.00%	31.87%	22.04%	10.21%	18.89%
	(8.22)	(6.96)	(5.96)	(5.42)	(6.71)
San Luis					
City Council	35.90%	25.99%	15.23%	14.36%	8.52%
	(10.96)	(9.72)	(8.77)	(11.98)	(10.85)
Brokers	31.85%	35.41%	13.17%	12.37%	7.20%
	(10.21)	(9.45)	(7.25)	(10.57)	(10.11)

Standard Errors are in parentheses and in percentage terms

Table 6: Can you transport a greater, equal or lower number of voters on election day?

Respondent Type	Less	Equal	More
Buenos Aires			
City Council	30.94%	6.63%	66.43%
	(.1111)	(.0687)	(.0909)
Brokers	25.93%	23.28%	50.79%
	(6.30)	(5.37)	(7.44)
Córdoba			
City Council	13.93%	24.15%	61.92%
	(5.74)	(8.40)	(8.28)
Brokers	25.33%	15.40%	59.28%
	(7.96)	(6.44)	(8.30)
Misiones			
City Council	9.13%	14.79%	76.07%
	(3.86)	(5.49)	(6.38)
Brokers	4.40%	14.95%	80.65%
	(3.21)	(5.25)	(6.09)
San Luis			
City Council	2.96%	18.41%	78.63%
	(3.99)	(9.04)	(9.49)
Brokers	12.64%	20.88%	66.48%
	(5.76)	(6.79)	(8.86)

Standard Errors are in parentheses and percentage terms.
The answers the answers "much less" and "less" and "much more" and "more" are pooled into the categories "Less" and "More."

First, city council members generally have more mobilizational capacity than brokers, which is consistent with the observation that city council members manage many brokers. Secondly, in every province a majority of brokers mobilize less than 200 people for rallies while the majority of city council members mobilize less than 300 people for rallies. In every province aside from Córdoba, 80% of the brokers organize less than 300 voters for rallies. Brokers in the lowest tiers of a machine often have an organization that is restricted to one neighborhood and organize very small amounts of voters. For example, in one municipality in the Conurbano, data from less structured interviews indicates that in some cities a typical neighborhood broker is expected to organize only 20 voters for elections.[6] Table (6) shows that that the majority of city council members and brokers mobilize more voters for the general election, although the responses vary across all categories. Since voters are required to vote by law in Argentina and generally more people vote in general elections than attend rallies, the difference is not surprising.

Although many of the respondents transport more voters for the general election, the number of voters that brokers turnout to rallies can serve as a lower-bound proxy of their mobilizational capacity that can be attributed to their own effort. If a broker can get a voter to go to a rally it is likely that they can get them to vote, while the reverse is less common. Moreover, party leaders use rallies to measure a brokers capacity.[7] For example, two brokers that I interviewed said that the city council member who employs them will be responsible for filling 35 buses and a

[6]Interview May 2010.

[7]See Szwarcberg (2009) for in depth descriptions of how party leaders use rallies to measure a broker's mobilization capacity.

party monitor will count the buses as they pass over a bridge into Buenos Aires, an activity that they call "counting the tickles." These brokers also have their voters counted when they turn them out for a rally at the municipal level.[8] The extensive monitoring mechanisms suggest that turnout to rallies is important for parties and brokers.

While in any given election, a broker's effort has the possibility of affecting an election, the probability that the marginal efforts of an individual who organizes 200 or even 300 supporters will affect an election is quite low. 1995 and 1999 municipal electoral data from 7 provinces and 1154 municipalities in Argentina shows that the average number of voters that participated in a municipal election for municipalities that have over 1000 people is 11088.17. Even a city council member who controls 300 voters would control only 2.71% of the votes in an average municipality, which is far below the 10% of voters that is the lower bound in the simulations that I performed. In 59% of the elections, less than 300 voters separated the first and second place parties, which gives the more powerful respondents in our survey considerable bargaining power if they control all of their voters. However, marginal efforts are unlikely to deliver 300 votes for an individual who mobilizes 300 or less voters for a rally. Marginal efforts that add 5 voters would only affect an mayoral election in 2.10% of the elections.[9] In the nine municipalities that we sampled in Buenos Aires, data from the 2009 national deputy elections show that the closest race was determined by 351 votes. The average difference between the first and second finishers was 11096 votes. Again a full withdraw of a broker's group may affect an election

[8]From an interview on June 8, 2010

[9]Data Source: Nazareno et al 2006

but marginal efforts are much less likely to have an effect.

The problem facing brokers is similar to the well-established voter's paradox. However, in the case of brokers the collective action problem is probably more pressing because organizing requires more time and resources than voting. While such a problem can be solved through a variety of ways, brokers who work to maximize their access to resources do not face such a problem. The model shows that as the size of a broker's group decreases, a party's vote share becomes less elastic to the responsiveness of voters in the broker's group. Conversely, as a broker's group size decreases, the per-capita amount of resources that a broker receives becomes more elastic to the responsiveness of the voters in the broker's group. More simply stated, brokers who organize small groups cannot substantially affect elections, but they can affect the per-capita amount of resources that they receive from the party.

2.2 Organizational Problems: Intra-Party Bargaining

Brokers who simply work to maximize their access to resources will not experience a collective action problem but can cost their party votes. The model predicts that brokers who can credibly threaten to withhold a larger number of voters will have more bargaining power and be able to procure more resources. Using the experimental design of the survey, I test the model's prediction that a broker's bargaining strength increases with the size of the broker's group. Finally, I test if brokers utilize exit options, which is a key source their bargaining power.

In the survey brokers and city council members were asked,

Imagine that a political boss thinks he can increase the number of votes

by taking resources from one broker and giving the resources to another broker. The broker who loses resources has a lot (a few) voters and all (very few) of the voters are loyal to him. How difficult would it be for the party leader to do this: Very Easy, Easy, Neither Easy nor Difficult, Difficult, or Very Difficult.

The question provides a test for a key assumption and prediction of the model. Table (7) shows that in every subpopulation, except for the brokers in Buenos Aires, a minority say it would be very easy or easy to transfer resources between brokers to increase the vote share. This indicates that many brokers prioritize their own access to resources and have some bargaining power. The difficulty of redistributing resources between brokers to increase a party's vote share, is likely due to brokers who are resisting efforts that would increase a party's vote share. The modal answer for some subpopuations is easy, which suggests that at least some brokers do not have substantial power to affect the distribution of resources or they do not prioritize access to these resources. However, table (7) reports the results for every treatment, which asks respondents to consider brokers who do not have a large number voters and/or these voters are not loyal to the broker. The model predicts that brokers who control more voters will be better able to influence the distribution of resources.

A broker's bargaining strength is a function of the number of voters that a broker controls. A broker can procure more resources from a boss when the broker can credibly threaten to withdraw a larger number of voters from the party, if the party leader and broker do not reach an agreement. The experimental design allows me to test this prediction with the survey instrument. The survey contained four versions of

Table 7: How difficult is it to take resources from one broker and give them to another to increase the party's vote share?

Respondent Type	Very Easy	Easy	Not Easy Nor Difficult	Difficult	Very Difficult
Buenos Aires					
City Council	12.58%	29.14%	21.18%	25.83%	11.28%
	(4.42)	(6.66)	(5.80)	(5.41)	(5.01)
Brokers	16.35%	38.69%	13.72%	24.58%	6.67%
	(5.32)	(6.41)	(4.26)	(5.35)	(3.66)
Córdoba					
City Council	7.79%	20.00%	28.26%	25.81%	18.15%
	(6.03)	(11.05)	(9.25)	(9.30)	(13.15)
Brokers	21.07%	28.30%	12.77%	10.88%	26.99%
	(9.63)	(10.56)	(6.21)	(6.34)	(13.57)
Misiones					
City Council	8.74%	17.89%	18.34%	38.60%	16.42%
	(4.41)	(5.64)	(6.13)	(7.43)	(5.43)
Brokers	9.83%	08.39%	27.72%	37.81%	17.17%
	(4.98)	(8.70)	(11.44)	(11.51)	(8.04)
San Luis					
City Council	18.89%	18.68%	18.44%	36.05%	7.95%
	(8.99)	(9.13)	(14.69)	(14.47)	(6.88)
Brokers	10.93%	26.00%	22.06%	24.42%	15.60%
	(10.21)	(10.46)	(9.32)	(8.65)	(14.12)

Standard Errors are in parentheses and in percentage terms.

this question that combined the different characteristics of the broker losing resources, thereby identifying brokers who have: many voters who are all loyal, many voters of whom very few are loyal, few voters who are all loyal, few voters of whom very few are loyal. Since the versions of the question were assigned randomly, the treatments should be independent of other characteristics that would affect the responses to this question. If the respondents say that it is just as easy to take resources away from a broker with a large number and/or loyal voters as it is for a broker with few and/or disloyal voters, then the respective prediction that the number and/or loyalty of voters gives the broker power is not correct.

Table (8) summarizes the the Sample Average Treatment Effects (SATE) by reporting the 95% and 90% confidence intervals for the difference in mean responses between the various treatments. The dependent variable is the five answers *very easy,... ,very difficult* measured on a interval scale of 1 to 5.[10] Contrary to the model's expectations the loyalty of a broker's group does not significantly affect the survey responses. However, a broker's group size has a significant effect.[11] The result supports the hypothesis that a broker derives power from the number of voters that a broker can claim to control.

Table (9) shows the SATEs that compare the treatment many versus the treatment few voters disaggregated for each province. With smaller populations the stan-

[10]The last two categories in the table were derived by combining the treatments that share the relevant characteristic. For example, the treatment Many Voters All Loyal is combined with Few Voters All Loyal to create the variable All Loyal. Aggregating the treatments provides a means to increase the number of observations for each test although it increases the noise in the measurements.

[11]Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests generate similar results. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test generates a p-value of .0125 for the treatments Many Voters All Loyal Vs. Few Voters and generates a p-value of .0046 for the treatments Many Voters Vs. Few Voters.

Table 8: Confidence Intervals for the Difference in Means between Treatments

Treatments	95% Confidence Interval		90% Confidence Interval	
Many Voters All Loyal Vs. Many Voters Not All Loyal	[-11.15%	40.28%]	[-7.00%	36.13%]
Few Voters All Loyal Vs. Few Voters Not All Loyal	[-26.92%	27.63%]	[-22.52%	23.23%]
Many Voters All Loyal Vs. Few Voters All Loyal	**[7.08%**	**59.81%]**	**[11.34%**	**55.55%]**
Many Voters Not All Loyal Vs. Few Voters Not All Loyal	[-7.32%	45.78%]	[-3.02%	41.49%]
All Loyal Voters Vs. Not All Loyal Voters	[-11.13%	26.40%]	[-8.11%	23.38%]
Many Voters Vs. Few Voters	**[7.96%**	**45.32%]**	**[10.97%**	**42.31%]**

dard errors are higher. However, the effect is still significant at the 10% level for three of the four provinces. There does not appear to be an effect in San Luis, which might be caused by the substantial power that the governor and party leaders hold in this province. However, further research is necessary to discern the causes of this difference in effects.[12]

[12]Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test generate similar results. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test respectively generates a p-values of .0625, .0803, .0918 and .7903 for Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Misiones and San Luis.

Table 9: Confidence Intervals for the Difference in Means between Treatments by Province

Treatments	95% Confidence Interval		90% Confidence Interval	
Buenos Aires	[-1.32%	61.63%]	**[3.77%**	**56.54%]**
Córdoba	[-3.22%	68.78%]	**[2.62%**	**62.93%]**
Misiones	[-4.86%	63.82%]	**[0.70%**	**58.25%]**
San Luis	[-60.12%	45.44%]	[-51.48%	36.81%]

For this table the independent variable is many versus few voters. It pools the loyal versus not all loyal treatments.

After asking the respondents about the ease of redistributing resources between brokers, the respondents were asked the following question:

> *What do you believe the broker, who lost resources, would do: It would not matter to him, he would get angry but do nothing, stop mobilizing his followers, work for a different boss in the same party, work for a different boss in a different party, or other*

This question provides an additional test for the assumption that brokers prioritize resources over vote-share. If most respondents answer *it would not matter to him*, then assuming that brokers prioritize resources over vote-share would not be a correct assumption. Moreover, we would expect the majority of the respondents to answer either *it would not matter to him* or *he would get mad but do nothing*, if

brokers prioritized the party's vote-share over procuring resources. In addition, this question allows us to test if brokers do in fact have exit options, which is the basis of their bargaining strength in the model.[13] If the most respondents answer *it would not matter to him* or *he would get mad but do nothing*, then concluding that most brokers have bargaining power, as defined in this model, and can threaten the party leader with the exit of voters would be incorrect.[14] Figure (10) shows the response rates for this question. To simply the presentation of the results I aggregated the response for the first two options, in which the broker continues organizing.

The results in table (10) suggest that many brokers can and do utilize exit options. Of all the subpopuations, only a clear majority of city council members in Córdoba say that the broker would continue organizing. In Buenos Aires the modal response is that brokers would abandon not only their party boss but also their party. This result challenges the argument that partisan affiliations necessarily limit the brokers' exit options and supports the assumption that brokers prioritize resources for their neighborhoods over vote-share for their party. It underscores that many brokers prioritize resources over their party's electoral victory. The results show that a party leader risks losing brokers and perhaps their voters, if she redistributes resources in order to increase vote share. Finally, with the exception of Córdoba, the least

[13]Exit options are the source of bargaining power for the broker because if a broker cannot credibly threaten to leave a party leader then the threat point for the party leader will essentially be equal to the party's vote-share. In other words, without exit options a broker cannot punish a party leader when the party leader does not accede to any of the broker's demands. This framework does ignore the broker's voice (Hirschman 1970) which could also be an effective source of bargaining strength.

[14]Interesting follow-up work could evaluate if brokers who have more exit options have more power to procure more resources. Ethnographic work already documents cases of voters and organized groups extracting high rents from politicians when clientelistic parties or groups within the a party compete with one another (Brusco *forthcoming*; Gay 1994; Gray 2004).

Table 10: How would a broker respond if a party leader took resources from him?

Respondent Type	Continue Organizing	Stop Organizing	Organize Other Boss	Organize Other Party
Buenos Aires				
City Council	40.27%	7.75%	15.76%	28.60%
	(7.78)	(4.06)	(5.64)	(5.64)
Brokers	26.52%	8.94%	23.78%	31.76%
	(6.69)	(3.82)	(5.59)	(7.76)
Córdoba				
City Council	55.53%	10.57%	20.96%	8.03%
	(10.44)	(5.98)	(8.01)	(4.64)
Brokers	37.81%	19.44%	26.87%	6.14%
	(7.37)	(9.27)	(11.34)	(4.13)
Misiones				
City Council	39.85%	11.73%	24.83%	17.68%
	(6.70)	(4.06)	(5.64)	(5.50)
Brokers	37.21%	13.82%	23.77%	16.97%
	(6.21)	(4.39)	(5.23)	(5.03)
San Luis				
City Council	42.19%	7.34%	14.19%	23.47%
	(11.96)	(7.40)	(12.59)	(17.83)
Brokers	39.16%	11.25%	27.91%	10.44%
	(8.70)	(4.82)	(10.37)	(5.65)

Standard Errors are in parentheses and in percentage terms. The answers "this would not matter to him" and "he would get angry but do nothing" are pooled into the category Continue Organizing

common response is that brokers would stop organizing. This indicates that brokers do not simply abandon their boss if they do not have valuable exit options, which supports the prediction that exit options give brokers more bargaining strength.

2.3 Organizational Structure: Intra-Party Competition

In the preceding sections, the analysis indicates that relying on a large number of brokers creates organizational problems for parties that use targeted and contingent resources to win votes. To win elections party leaders must motivate brokers to contribute large amounts of time and effort to party activities, while minimizing their brokers' power to procure too many resources. Moreover party leaders cannot monitor or even direct the daily activities of their brokers, nor can they anticipate all of the problems that will arise in the lives of voters. Under these information constraints party leaders must also motivate brokers to creatively solve the everyday problems that arise in the lives of voters. The model predicts that intra-party competition can motivate brokers and minimize their bargaining power. The model departs further from the pervasive assumption that parties are unified teams by anticipating that we will find substantial competition between party activists within a single party.[15]

The model predicts that party leaders will create structures than induce intra-party competition to force brokers to distribute resources to voters and give brokers incentives to increase their marginal efforts for the party. If this prediction is correct, we should observe evidence of intra-party competition. The survey provides two

[15]Camp and Szwarcberg (2011) develop a similar model in which they predict that intra-party competition limits the amount of resources that brokers consume, while motivating brokers to become more efficient.

measures intra-party competition.

In the survey we asked city council members and brokers the following questions:

> *In the neighborhood where you are a brokers, can you tell me approximately how many total brokers from every party exist?*
>
> *And how many of these brokers are from your party?*
>
> *And with how many of these brokers from your party do you compete?*

Table (11) indicates that a large portion of brokers in a neighborhood are from the same party, which gives party leaders an opportunity to induce competition between brokers. However, the table shows that on average brokers compete with fewer brokers than the number of brokers that are from their party and neighborhood and many respondents said that they did not compete with anyone from their party. While this result suggests that intra-party competition is not pervasive, respondents may have under-reported the amount of intra-party competition. Admitting to competing against brokers from one's own party implies that all of the members of a party are not engaged in political work because they only believe in the ideological project of their party. It is admitting to a lack of solidarity. Since the question directly asks a respondent how many brokers with whom she competes, the respondent must admit to their own lack of solidarity. An indication of the unease that this question created is that some brokers would say that they do not compete with anyone but the other brokers compete with them. Despite the incentives to underreport the level of competition, many still admitted to competing with broker's from the same party, which stands in contrast to a Downsian conception of political parties.

Table 11: Mean Brokers per neighborhood

	Total Brokers	Same Party	Intra-Party Competition
Buenos Aires			
City Council	26.16	19.57	2.36
	(7.0021)	(6.9051)	(0.8307)
Brokers	15.46	9.63	2.70
	(2.9907)	(2.4543)	(0.9981)
Córdoba			
City Council	8.88	8.36	0.93
	(1.6268)	(4.4676)	(0.3484)
Brokers	37.57	19.64	5.29
	(29.7182)	(14.7729)	(5.1983)
Misiones			
City Council	12.75	5.67	2.23
	(2.4331)	(1.1757)	(0.5693)
Brokers	10.22	8.12	1.82
	(2.4635)	(3.1835)	(0.6442)
San Luis			
City Council	5.28	3.07	0.62
	(1.0766)	(0.7653)	(0.4911)
Brokers	9.09	4.48	0.59
	(3.8295)	(2.7637)	(0.2870)

Standard Errors are in parentheses.

If intra-party competition is not pervasive, then we expect that brokers will be more threatened by competition by brokers from opposing parties. In the survey we asked city council members and brokers the following question:

> *Imagine two brokers compete for the support of the voters in the same nieghborhood, which situation would present more risk for a broker?*
>
> - *Competition from a broker from the other political party*
> - *Competition from a broker from the same political party*

Table 12: Is intra or inter party competition more risky for brokers?

Respondent Type	Different Party	Same Party	Standard Error
Buenos Aires			
City Council	29.97%	70.03%	7.63
Brokers	35.89%	64.11%	6.74
Córdoba			
City Council	46.86%	53.13%	9.48
Brokers	48.08%	51.92%	9.70
Misiones			
City Council	59.49%	40.51%	6.55
Brokers	57.25%	42.75%	6.48
San Luis			
City Council	53.38%	46.62%	10.22
Brokers	46.42%	53.58%	11.89

Standard Errors are in percentage terms.

The results in table (12) show that in many subpopuations a majority of actors say competition from brokers within their party presents greater risk. If intra-party

competition was not pervasive then competition from brokers within the same party should not present a great risk. If brokers face greater risk from those within their party, then intra-party competition must have consequences for brokers. Party leaders who induce competition between brokers may create these consequences, as the model predicts.

3 Conclusion

The empirical results results largely confirm the core predictions and assumptions of the thesis. A large number of intermediaries make cleintelism effective by building relationships with individual voters and undertaking a substantial amount of activity that requires both effort and entrepreneurialism. Resources and information flow through these intermediaries and the social networks that they create, which provides incentives for voters to participate in these social networks. However, depending on such a large number of intermediaries who must undertake such a substantial amount of activity causes organizational challenges. Intra-party competition is used to ameliorate these challenges and it give brokers an intrinsic incentive to work hard for the party because doing so increases their own power.

In this chapter, I have established empirical support for the micro-level predictions of the model, which provide a basis for the macro-level predictions. Leaders of political machines must overcome organizational problems that they face from relying on a large number of intermediaries. Leaders should be better able to induce intra-party competition and limit their broker's bargaining power if they face lower

levels of competition and monopolize the public resources in their polity. In the following chapter, I will test the the macro-level predictions using inter-provincial and inter-municipal data.

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