Redistribution, Public Goods & Political Market Failures
Yale University | April 9-10, 2010
Sponsored by the Georg Walter Leitner Program in International and Comparative Political Economy. Conference Organizer: Ana L. De La O.
Expectations about the role of democratic institutions in development have changed considerably in recent decades. We now have ample evidence that around the developing world elections are compatible with low redistribution, rampant corruption and limited provision of social policies and public services. This conference aims to bring together researchers working on core questions about the poor performance of democracies. What are the trends in social policies adopted by low and middle income countries? What are the political consequences of new social policies? How are social policies interacting with clientelism? What political factors shape the distribution of social policies and public services? Under what conditions do voters prefer public goods rather than private transfers? Can institutions explain divergent distributive outcomes in countries where poverty and inequality are high? How do corruption, and other political market failures, distort the provision of social policy and public services? Throughout the conference, researchers will present evidence from India, Benin, Ghana, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Russia, among other countries.
Fields of Interest: Political Economy, Comparative Politics